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THE EXTENSION OF COUNTY JURISDICTION
OVER INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN CALIFORNIA:
PUBLIC LAW 280 AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The extent to which a county may enforce its local ordinances
on Indian reservations located within that county is one of the most
crucial legal and political issues facing California Indians today.
County ordinances which reflect local citizens' views on such municipal
affairs as public health standards and land use allocations validly impose restrictions and/or penalties on persons who do not comply with
them.' The same restrictions and/or penalties may, however, seriously
threaten the survival of Indian tribal structure on the reservations when
their application renders tribal custom unlawful or tribal enterprise
financially unfeasible. Because most federal assistance to Indians is
channeled through the tribes on the reservations,' because the reservations represent the only land base left to Indians, and because for
many Indians that land base offers the primary resource from which
economic survival is possible,3 local ordinances which deny Indians a
viable existence on the reservations may precipitate dire consequences
far in excess of those imposed on the community at large.
Although jurisdiction over Indian reservations originally rested
exclusively with the federal government,4 recent impositions of county
1.

"A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,

sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws."

CAL.

CoNsr. art. 11, § 7; see, e.g., Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 344, 115 P.2d 455,
457 (1941) (zoning county for residential purposes); In re Jones, 56 Cal. App. 2d 658,
664, 133 P.2d 418, 421 (1943) (regulation of business).
2. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-1341 (Supp. II, 1972); Sclar, Participationby Off-Reservation Indians in Programs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health
Service, 33 MONT. L. Rav. 191, 197-98 (1972).
3. See A. SoRmIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL Am 157 (1971), citing H.
Hough, DEvELOpmENT OF INDIAN REsouRcEs 162 (1967); Comment, The Problems of
Indian Poverty: The Shrinking Land Base and Ineffective Education, 36 ALBANY

L. REv. 143 (1971).
4.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Regarding the state of Georgia's jurisdiction

over the Cherokee reservation, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokee themselves,

or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse
between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
560-61 (1832).
[1451]
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jurisdiction are the result of partially successful efforts in the early
1950's to terminate federal accountability for Indian problems. This
policy of termination 5 resulted in the passage of what is generally referred to as Public Law 280.6 Public Law 280 granted to several
states, including California, criminal and civil jurisdiction over the reservations; that grant, however, was not a plenary grant and was limited by restrictions which were designed to protect the federal trust
status of the reservations. 7 Whether or not that limited delegation of

jurisdiction included not only the general laws of the state enacted by
the state legislature but also the many ordinances of each county is
a controversial question with significant ramifications. The Ninth Circuit was recently presented an opportunity to decide this crucial social
and legal issue in the three cases of Rincon Band of Mission Indians
v. County of San Diego,8 Ricci v. County of Riverside,' and Madrigal

v. County of Riverside,' ° but declined to reach the merits of the controversy on procedural grounds.

The Rincon Case
The facts of the Rincon case have never been in dispute."
In
October of 1970, the chairman of the business committee of the Rincon Band of Mission Indians 2 requested attorneys for California Indian Legal Services (CILS)' 3 to determine the legality of opening a
5. See 99 CONG. REC. 10933 (1953), quoting H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess. "Termination" has been defined as, "the legal process of depriving an Indian
of his Indian-ness, divesting him of all of his inherited treaty rights, usually in exchange for a cash settlement representing his per capita share of his tribe's liquidated
assets." H. HOUGH, DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN RESOURCES 160-61 (1967), cited in A.
SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL

6.

AID 156 (1971).

Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in part as 18 U.S.C.

§ 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)).

7.
8.
9.
10.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162(a)-(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(b)-(c) (1970).
- F.2d -(9th Cir. 1974).
-

F.2d F.2d -

(9th Cir. 1974).
(9th Cir. 1974).

11. Interview with Herbert Becker, Director, California Indian Legal Services,
Berkeley, Cal., Dec. 4, 1973.
12. The Rincon Reservation was established by Executive Order on December 27,
1875. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County
of San Diego, -

F.2d -

(9th Cir. 1974).

13. "California Indian Legal Services started as a special project of California
Rural Legal Assistance Program back in 1966. It spun off and got its own funding
in 1967 and has existed as California Indian Legal Services ever since that time. At
present we operate five offices and an outreach office out of the law school at UCLA.
Our major emphasis is on projects in which we can do two things. One is to preserve
the existing land base that is in California and the other is to try to expand it in some
manner consistent with federal law and the different needs of the Indians." Interview
with Herbert Becker, Director of California Indian Legal Services, in Berkeley, Cal.,
Dec. 4, 1973.
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tribally owned cardroom in which traditional Indian games of chance
would be played. The business committee expected such a tribal enterprise to 'become a significant source of income for the Band, especially in view of the imminent closing of a cardroom in the nearby
city of Escondido. 15 The response to inquiries by CILS on behalf of
the Band revealed that despite the absence of any prohibition of these
games by the California Penal Code, 1 6 a county ordinance prohibited
the leasing of property within unincorporated areas of the county for
any form of gambling. 7 The sheriff and the county counsel believed
that since the Rincon Reservation was located within the unincorporated areas of the county, the tribe was prohibited by the county ordinance from opening the cardroom.18 The Rincon Band, believing the

county to be without jurisdiction over the reservation, sued to enjoin
enforcement of the county ordinance.
The federal district court, in an opinion written by District Judge

Turrentine, accepted the Rincon Band's argument that any county
jurisdiction must stem from Public Law 280;19 however, he found that
the county ordinance came within the meaning of that statute because

it is a criminal law of California.2 ° In rejecting the Band's argument
that Public Law 280 made applicable only laws enacted by the Califor14. "[S]uch games have been an integral part of the cultural heritage of the
members of the Rincon Band, and many other Indian tribes, for literally hundreds of
years. . .
Cf. Culin, Games of the North American Indians, Annual Report of the
Bureau of American Ethnology, No. 24 (1903)." Opening Brief for Appellant at 24,
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
15. Interview with Herbert Becker, Director of California Indian Legal Services,
in Berkeley, Cal., Dec. 4, 1973.
16. "Every person who deals, plays, or carries on, opens, or causes to be opened,
or who conducts, either as owner or employ6, whether for hire or not, any game of
faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge et noire, rondo, tan, fan-tan, stud-horse poker,
seven-and-a-half, twenty-one, hokey-pokey, or any banking or percentage game played
with cards, dice, or any device, for money, checks, credit, or other representative of
value, and every person who plays or bets at or against any of said prohibited games,
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than one hundred
dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." CAL. PEN. CoDE §
330 (West 1970).
17. SAN DmNGo CouNTY, CAL., GAMBLING ORDINANCE, div. 7, ch. 1-2, §§ 37.101.201.
18. Interview with Herbert Becker, Director of California Indian Legal Services,
in Berkeley, Cal., Dec. 4, 1973.
19. See Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp.
371, 373 (S.D. Cal. 1971). The county argued in the alternative that the local ordinance applied either by virtue of Public Law 280 or by virtue of the county's inherent
police power; it maintained that position in the Ninth Circuit. Brief for Appellee at
4-10, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir.
1974).
20. 324 F. Supp. at 375.
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nia legislature, Judge Turrentine recognized that the question had not
been frequently litigated. 21 Nevertheless, he discounted the Band's
contention that alternatively or collectively the imposition of county
ordinances on reservations would violate the express language of the
statute, constitute an encumbrance in violation of the statutory prohibition of an encumbrance on federal trust property, and regulate trust
property in a manner inconsistent with federal policy to encourage the
development of economic self-sufficiency on the reservations.2 2 In
reaching that conclusion, Judge Turrentine examined the legislative
24
history of Public Law 280,23 various indices of congressional intent,
25
a recent decision by the state court in Washington,
analogy to non20
logic.
personal
of
bit
a
and
Indian related cases,
In sum, Judge Turrentine held in the Rincon decision that Public Law 280 granted the necessary jurisdiction to San Diego County
to enforce its local ordinances on the Rincon Band
reservation. The
27
Band appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ricci Case
The facts surrounding Ricci v. County of Riverside21 were also
undisputed. After many years of experience in the construction industry in Los Angeles, Mr. Ricci returned -to the Pechanga Indian Reservation2 9 with his wife, Elizabeth. Mr. Ricci began constructing a
new home on land owned by Mrs. Ricci, an allottee3 ° of the reservation. After he had completed 90 percent of the work on the new
home, the county building director made a fortuitous inspection, found
several county building code violations, and decided to "red tag"'" the
21. Id. at 373.
22. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see text accompanying notes 279383 infra.
23. 324 F. Supp. at 374.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 373-74, citing Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.
2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
26. See id. at 375.

27.

Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371

(S.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1927 (9th Cir., June 17, 1971).
28. Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).

29. The Pechanga Indian Reservation was established by Executive Order on June
27, 1882. The trust patent for the 4100 acres in the unincorporated territory of Riverside County was issued on August 29, 1893. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4, Ricci
v. County of Riverside, -

F.2d -

(9th Cir. 1974).

30. "One, generally an Indian, freedman, or adopted citizen of a tribe of Indians,
to whom a tract of land out of a common holding, has been given by, or under the
supervision of, the United States." Lynch v. Franklin, 37 Okla. 60, 64, 130 P. 599,
600 (1913), cited in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 101 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
31. This expression is used to denote an order by the building director to stop
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house. The Riccis' admitted violations of the county building code
included the lack of a building permit, pipe materials not recognized
by the code, and glass window panes of inadequate dimensions. 2
Mr. Ricci did the major part of the work on the house himself, and
he was unable to afford the large sums necessary for compliance with
the code. Riverside County told him to halt construction on the house
or risk arrest by the county sheriff. Moreover, the county warned him
that his failure to correct the code violations could lead Riverside
County to declare that the house was a public nuisance and subsequently to demolish it. Despite the absence of any functional defects
in the house and the exorbitant costs which compliance with the code
would require, the county took an intransigent position. 3 Faced with
a complete loss on the home which they had saved to build, the Riccis
sued to enjoin enforcement of the building code on the grounds that
Riverside County lacked jurisdiction over the reservation.
Judge Crary found that the Riccis were entitled to a permanent
injunction restraining the county from requiring a building permit for
construction of the existing dwelling because inadequate notice had
been given the Riccis of the Riverside County Building Code's applicability to the reservation; he also found that the county was entitled
to a judgment which declared that the county possesses jurisdiction to
enforce local ordinances on the reservation. 4 In, examining issues
which were substantially the same as those in Rincon, 5 Judge Crary
found that Public Law 280 granted criminal jurisdiction to the county.
Further, he determined that the ordinance constituted neither an encumbrance nor a regulation of trust property inconsistent with federal
The Riccis subsequently
treaty, agreement, statute, or regulation.
appealed that portion of the opinion which held that the county possesses jurisdiction to enforce its building code on -thereservation.
The Madrigal Case
The facts surrounding Madrigal v. County of Riverside38 are more
work or terminate occupancy of a building constructed in a manner contrary to code
provisions. See SAN Dmao CouNTY, CAL., UmFORM BuiLDING CODE § 2(I) (1970).
32. Interview with George Forman, Attorney for California Indian Legal Services, in Berkeley, Cal., Dec. 4, 1973.
33. Id.
34. Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9,
1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
35. See text accompanying notes 11-26 supra.
36. Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9,
1971).
37. Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9,
1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law), appeal docketed, No. 72-1256 (9th
Cir., Feb. 7, 1972).
38. Civ. No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law), appeal docketed, No. 71-2043 (9th Cir., July 6, 1971).
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complex than either the Rincon or Ricci cases. The plaintiff, Lela
Madrigal, was a member of the Cahuilla Band of Mission Indians3 9
and the assignee by inheritance of about 320 acres of land within the
Cahuilla Reservation. She leased her assigned land for ninety days
for $10,000 to two persons who in turn subleased the land to a third
party. These transactions were intended to obtain the land for an outdoor rock festival. The preparations for the rock festival included digging a well, constructing ramadas, and erecting a stage. The appropriate county permits for these preparations, as well as the permit for
the rock festival itself, were not sought from the county, and thus the
county attempted to halt the festival for the promoters' failure to secure the permits required by county ordinance. Ms. Madrigal sued
to enjoin enforcement of the county ordinances on the ground that
the county lacked jurisdiction over the reservation. Again, the federal
district court found that Public Law 280 conferred the necessary jurisdiction to the county, and that the county had exercised that power
in conformity with Public Law 280.40
The Ninth Circuit's Decision
Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal were consolidated for argument to
the Ninth Circuit, "since each purported to present a similar legal issue, viz., whether ordinances of Riverside and San Diego Counties
relating to gambling, building, and outdoor festivals are applicable to
Indian reservations within those counties by virtue of Public Law 280
.... ,,41 In an opinion by Thomas F. Murphy, Senior United States
District Judge, Southern District of New York, sitting by designation,
the Ninth Circuit declined to address the issue due to a "vexing initial
question of jurisdiction either of this Court or the District Court." 2
In Rincon, Judge Murphy found that the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution was not satisfied because
of "the general threat of enforcement of the San Diego ordinance and
the absence of any arrests for violating such ordinance."4 3 The lower
court decision was accordingly reversed and the complaint dismissed."
In Ricci, the appeal was dismissed as moot in light of the permanent
39.

The Cahuilla Indian Reservation is located near Anza, California, within the

unincorporated territory of Riverside County.

Madrigal v. County of Riverside, Civ.

No. 70-1893EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
40. Civ. No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law), appeal docketed, No. 71-2043 (9th Cir., July 6, 1971).
41. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d -,

Cir. 1974).
42.

Id. at-.

43.

Id. at-.

44.

Id. at -.

-(9th
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injunction issued as to the Riccis4 5 because "whatever -threat -there was
of prosecution because of other possible violations of the Building
Code does not create a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant consideration of that part of the judgment declaring the Riverside County Building Code applied to the plaintiff and
the Pechanga Indian Reservation." 46 The court also noted that the
district court should not have assumed jurisdiction in the first instance
because of failure to prove that the matter in controversy exceeded
$10,000 as required in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).4 7 In Madrigal, Judge
Murphy found that the proof at trial failed to support the basis of the
complaint as well as the allegation that the matter in controversy
exceeded $10,000.48
At this -time, attorneys in Rincon and Ricci are preparing petitions for rehearing.4 9 Attorneys for San Diego County will reportedly
challenge the reversal and dismissal in Rincon for insufficient threat
of prosecution on the basis of Steifel v. Thompson,"° a United States
Supreme Court decision handed down only two days after the Ninth
Circuit decided Rincon. In Steffel, the petitioner and a companion were
threatened with arrest for distributing handbills protesting the Vietnam
war in violation of a state statute. The petitioners filed a complaint in
the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requested a declaratory judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. The complaint alleged that the
Georgia statute with which petitioner was threatened was in violation
of petitioner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.51 The district
court dismissed the action for failure to present "the rudiments of an
active controversy between the parties." 5 The decision of the district court was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, but reversed by the
Supreme Court. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court found
that "it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual
arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute he claims
deters the exercise of his constitutional rights." 53 It may be argued
before the Ninth Circuit that such a threat is equally present in Rincon
and as such, a justiciable controversy is presented.
Attorneys for California Indian Legal Services are also seeking
45. See text accompanying note 384 infra.
46.

Ricci v. County of Riverside, -

F.2d --

(9th Cir. 1974).

-

47. Id. at-.
48.

Madrigal v. County of Riverside, -

F.2d

-,

-

(9th Cir. 1974).

49. Interview with George Forman, Attorney for California Indian Legal Services, Berkeley, Cal., March 4, 1974.
50. 42 U.S.L.W. 4357 (U.S. March 19, 1974).
51.

Id. at 4358.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 4359. It should be noted that Steffel may be distinguished as dealing
with 1st and 5th Amendment rights not present in Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal.
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a rehearing in Ricci." The petition will reportedly challenge the
court's decision that the additional county requirements, not covered
by an injunction, are an insufficient threat of prosecution and thus
render the appeal moot. Further, the petitioner will dispute the
court's ruling with respect to the amount in controversy. 55
Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's decision to leave the issue unresolved, the question of whether county jurisdiction extends over Indian reservations is one of substantial legal and social significance. For
the Indians, an unfavorable answer to this question may well spell the
final blow to tribal culture and identity as founded in the semi-autonomous reservation system. For the counties, a favorable answer would
unleash hitherto unrealized power to control and dictate the use of
reservation lands. The interests involved are evidenced by the fact
that each side in the controversy now seeks to have the Ninth Circuit
rehear the matter and render a decision on the merits. Perhaps this
effort will be successful. Perhaps the issue will remain unresolved
until such time as an acceptable case reaches the courts. In either
event, the question must be answered and the controversy resolved.
In recognition of the importance of the question of county jurisdiction
over Indian reservations, this note will argue that Public Law 280
should not be construed to authorize a plenary delegation of authority
to the counties. If the Ninth Circuit had reached the merits of these
cases and agreed with the restrictive interpretation of Public Law 280
advocated here, the three cases of Rincon, Ricci and Madrigal would
have been reversed.
The first portion of this note 6 will present an historical background to the question of the extent of county jurisdiction over Indian
reservations. It will discuss the history of the legal relationships between the Indian tribes, especially those of California, and the state
or federal government. It will also trace Public Law 280 in its proper
historical scheme, its legislative evolution, and its impact during the
last twenty years on the reservations. The grave effects which the
Ninth Circuit's failure to construe Public Law 280 narrowly would have
on the quality of Indian life on reservations throughout California can
only be understood in light of this complex legal and historical background.
The second portion of this note 57 will shift the focus of discussion
54. Interview
ices, Berkeley, Cal.,
55. Id. It is
cuit's decision that

with George Forman, Attorney for California Indian Legal ServMarch 4, 1974.
also worthy of note that in a strangely circular way, the Ninth Cirthe district court lacked jurisdiction may have jeopardized the in-

junction on which the Ninth Circuit found the case to be moot!
56.

See text accompanying notes 64-182 infra.

57.

See text accompanying notes 182-283 infra.
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from the social and historical analysis of the legal interactions between
Indians and the federal or state governments to an analysis of the recent legal controversy arising from that pattern of interactions. This
section of the note will outline the various arguments which were presented to the Ninth Circuit in Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal. A brief
examination of the counties' claim (discounted by all three federal district courts below) of their inherent police power jurisdiction, 5 regardless of the delegation of jurisdiction in Public Law 280, will precede
a review of the arguments surrounding that statute. The threshold
determination of the proper rule of statutory construction 9 will precede
a discussion of the following statutory issues presented to the Ninth
Circuit: (1) What is a "criminal law of the State" within the meaning of Public Law 280?60
(2) What constitutes an "encumbrance"? 61 and (3) What is a "regulation of trust property inconsistent with federal statute, ,treaty, or policy"? 62
Historical Background
To deal adequately with the question of Public Law 280's effect
on county jurisdiction over Indian reservations in California, it is
necessary to review the historical basis for federal jurisdiction over the
once sovereign Indian tribes. The progressive deterioration of tribal
sovereignty and the concurrent assumption of jurisdiction by the federal government will be examined in three parts: 63 The period of
Spanish and Mexican domination up to 1848; the period of treaty negotiations by the United States government with tribes as independent
nations up to 1871; and the period of United States assumption of
jurisdiction over the reservations by congressional fiat from 1871 to
1974.
Spanish and Mexican Domination 1769-1850
When the Spanish first became established in California in 1769,
there were approximately 200,000 Indians living as hunting and fishing people within hundreds of distinct societies. 64 With the coming
of the Franciscan priests, 25,000 of the natives were confined in missions and forced to labor for the Spanish.65 Although the mortality
rate of the enslaved portion of the population was devastating,6 6 an
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See text accompanying notes 188-213 infra.
See text accompanying notes 214-78 infra.
See text accompanying notes 279-312 infra.
See text accompanying notes 314-37 infra.
See text accompanying notes 338-83 infra.
See text accompanying notes 64-182 infra.
J. COLLIER, THE INDIANS OF AMERICAS 220 (1947).
Id. at 220-22.
The native population had been reduced from 200,000 in 1769 to 110,000-
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important legal concept emerged during the Spanish occupation-Indian property rights.
The strange emergence of property rights for an enslaved population had its beginnings in the system set up by the Spanish in their
conquest of Mexico. Prior to the Spanish conquest, "[t]he basis of
the political form of private organization was the common ownership
'6 7
of land . . . . There were no land titles and no system of heritage.
In recognition of this system, the Spanish government legally established three types of community-owned real estate: (1) a town site
(funds legal), (2) pasturage (edigos), and (3) commons (tierras
communales). Because these estates were preserved even when included within the boundaries of land grants of the Spanish Crown, an
Indian could be forced to labor for a hacienda while maintaining his
individual property rights. 68
As the Spanish government extended its influence into California,
a similar dichotomy of land owned by slaves resulted. By 1777, the
Spanish government instituted the system of pueblos, or towns, within
the four provinces of California--San Diego, Santa Barbara, Monterey,
and San Francisco. 69 Indians living in these areas were deemed by
the Spanish to hold their lands in common under the tribal structure.
The Spanish could not deprive the Indians of their land without their
common consent. Although it is undeniably true that the Spanish permitted whites to occupy Indian lands, the fact that their occupation
was by patent and subject to the Indians' title established Spanish
7
recognition of the Indians' right to the fee. 0
Under Mexican rule in the 1800's, California Indians continued
to hold the right to possession and use of their lands. That right was
considered "an aboriginal right which antedated the sovereignty of
Spain and Mexico, not derived from either, but recognized and protected by both. ' 71 Recognition by the Spanish and Mexican governments of an aboriginal property right is important because any claim
by the United States of jurisdiction over land in California is derived
from Mexico's cession of those lands to the United States at the close
of the Mexican-American War.
130,000 in 1850 when the United States assumed control of California. It should be
noted, however, that after only thirty-five years of United States' domination, the native
population numbered less than 20,000. Id. at 22-23.
67. J. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WoRLD DAmA 243 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.

1971).
68.

Id. at 244.

69.
70.

Id. at 245.
See id.

71.

Id.
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United States' Treaty Policy 1850-1871
Mexican domination of the Indians ended with the Treaty of
Guadalupe-IHidalgo; 72 it was signed February 2, 1848, with the conclusion of the Mexican-American War. At that time California became a part of the United States. Article VIII of the treaty protected
the property rights of all former Mexicans:
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to
Mexico, and which remain for the future within the limits of the
United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be free to
continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the
Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in
the said territories, or disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their being subjected, on this
account, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever.7 3
Because the Mexican Constitution treated Indians as Mexicans, 74 article VIII upheld Indian rights to their land. Article IX of the treaty
provided that Mexicans remaining in California "shall be maintained
and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property. . .. 71

Article XI of the treaty further obligated the United States

-torecognize that
the sacredness of this obligation shall never be lost sight of by the
said government when providing for the removal of the Indians
from any portion of the said territories, or for its being settled by
citizens of the United States; but on the contrary, special care shall
then be taken not to place its Indian occupants under the necessity
of seeking new homes, by committing those invasions which the
United States have solemnly obliged themselves to restrain. 76
Less than a decade after the treaty was signed, the fever of the California Gold Rush tolled the beginning of more than a century of violations of these property rights which the United States had once
solemnly promised to protect. The stampede for California gold made
most land in California too valuable to be left undisturbed.77
72. Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207 (effective July
4, 1848) (Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo).
73. Id. art. VIII, 9 Stat. at 929.
74. J. WIsE, Tim RED MAN IN Tm NEW WoRLD DRAMA 246 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.
1971).
75. Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, art. IX, 9 Stat. 922, 930, T.S. No. 207
(effective July 4, 1848) (Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo).
76. Id. art. XI, 9 Stat. at 932, cited in J. WIsE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW
WoRLu DRAMA 246 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed. 1971).
77. Horace Bell expressed the fever pitch characteristic of the late 1800's: "We
will let those rascally redskins know that they have no longer to deal with the Spaniard or the Mexican, but with the invincible race of American backwoodsmen, which
has driven the savage from Plymouth Rock to the Rocky Mountains, and has headed
him off here on the western shore of the continent, and will drive him back to meet
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On September 9, 1850, the United States Congress adopted two
7
significant measures. First, it admitted California into the Union
and second, it passed legislation which expressly provided that in any
present or future territories nothing should be done to impair Indian
property rights in the absence of treaties. In fact, Indian lands were
not to be presumed part of the Territory without express tribal consent." Significantly, Indian land in the new state of California failed
to win these protections by less than a day because the protection of
Indian land extended only to lands under a territorial government on
the ninth of September. If California's admission to the Union had
come a day later, on the tenth, the Indian lands of California would
have received the legislative protection afforded the territories.
Regarding the Indian lands of the state of California, an act of
September 30, 1850, appropriated funds to finance the negotiation of
treaties with the Indians of California. 0 Three commissioners, sent
by President Polk for that purpose, arranged eighteen treaties with
various California tribes.8 " These treaties ceded to the United States
the Indian land on or near gold country. California's Superintendent
of Indian Affairs, the Honorable Edward F. Beale, described the land
which the Indians received in exchange in the southern portion of the
state as "only such lands as are unfit for mining or agricultural purposes, 2 and undoubtedly composed of the most barren and sterile
lands to be found in California . . . .,
By these treaties, California Indians ceded 75 million acres to the United States out of their
84
original holding of 83.5 million acres.
On July 8, 1852, the Senate failed to ratify the treaties.8s This
his kindred fleeing westward, all to be drowned in the great Salt Lake."

H.

BELL,

116 (1881), cited in B. WILSON, THE INDIANS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IN 1852, xxiii (1952).
78. Act of September 9, 1850, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452.
79. Act of September 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 447, R.S. 1839 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §
1451 (1970) (although act is indexed in Statutes-at-Large, it is not printed there).
80. Act of September 30, 1850, ch. 91, § 1, 9 Stat. 544, 558.
REMINISCENCES OF A RANGER

81.

See IV

INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS AND TREATIES

1081-128 (C. Kappler ed. 1929).

For a description of the conditions under which these treaties were negotiated, see M.
PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN

406-19 (1973).

82. Letter from Edward F. Beale, Superintendent of Indian Affairs of California
to the Hon. Luke Lea, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 11, 1852, cited in
IV INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS AND TREATIES 1089 (C. Kappler ed. 1929).
83. Id.

84. J. COLLIER, THE INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS 224 (1947).
85. J. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 253 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.
1971).
When the treaties were eventually made public in 1906, the following postscript
was found: "June 7, 1852.

Read and with the documents and treaties referred to the

Committee on Indian Affairs and offered to be printed in confidence for the use of
the Senate. January 18, 1905. Injunction of secrecy removed." id.
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result may have been due to congressional recognition of the inequities
surrounding the treaties;8" it may also have been attributable to the
lobbying of the California legislature, which advocated the total removal of all Indians to areas beyond the state line.87 Facing certain
destruction at the hands of the new settlers if they continued to reside
on their traditional lands, the Indians had begun their migration to
the lands set aside by the treaties in November 1851.88 But after
the ratification failed in the Senate, the government failed to notify
the Indians that the treaties meant nothing. 9 Thus, the California In-

dians possessed neither their ancient lands nor those outlined in the
treaties; they had virtually no place to go.90

Meanwhile, the act of March 3, 1851, established the California
Claims Commission and required that anyone who claimed land under

earlier Spanish or Mexican law had to file a claim with the commission."' Uninformed of the procedure and believing 9 the
question of
2

land to be settled by treaty, the Indians filed few claims.
United States' Assumption of Jurisdiction 1871-1974

Until 1871, Congress had recognized the status of Indian tribes
as that of sovereign nations: treaties were negotiated by the federal
government with Indian tribes for ithe cession of land.93 In 1871,
however, Congress abandoned the use of treaties, leaving the regula86. "Some of the stipulations contained in them were characterized as new, especially those requiring the Indians to relinquish all claims to their tribal domains and
accept in lieu thereof not reservations proper but small tracts not previously occupied
by them, a method designed, of course, to remove them entirely from the gold country
and thus make way for the miners. Yet, no annuities whatever were provided to enable
the Indians to subsist while converting the land to be assigned to them in the vast wilderness of California agriculture. All disputes henceforth were to be adjusted by 'local
agents,' and all legal controversies were to be settled by the civil tribunals of California." Id. at 249.
87. See id. at 250; I. Sutton, Land Tenure in Southern California, 1964 (unpublished thesis at U.C.L.A.), cited in M. PRicE, LAw AN Tm ARmlcAN INDIAN 41819 (1973).
88. J. WisE, Tim RED MAN iN THE NEw WORL DRAMA 253 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.
1971).
89. NATiVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, ANNoUNCEMENTS, No. 4, (Sept. 1972).
90. J. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 253 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.
1971).
91. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 41, § 8, 9 Stat. 631, 632.
92. KENNY, HISTORY AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT-CLAIMS OF CALIFORNmA INDIANS 19-21 (1944), cited in Selar, Participation by Off-Reservation Indians in Prograins of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service, 33 MNT. L.
REv. 191, 221-22 (1972).
93. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 498 (1905); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S.
445, 483 (1899).
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tion of Indian affairs to be handled by federal statute.9 4 For California Indians who had never even enjoyed the benefits of a ratified
treaty, the 1871 act represented a unilateral assumption of jurisdiction
by the federal government.
One of the most important pieces of legislation which resulted
from this change in policy from bilateral treaties to unilateral control
by Congress was the General Allotment Act of 1887,15 frequently referred to as the Dawes Act. The Dawes Act was designed to vest
American Indians with individual property interest by authorizing the
President to allot 40, 80, or 160 acres to individual members of the
tribes.9 6 As it turned out, the act was designed to divest the Indian
of his land. 97 Section 5 of the Dawes Act provided:
[a]t any time after lands have been allotted to all the Indians of any
tribe as herein provided, or sooner if in the opinion of the President
it shall be for the best interests of said tribe, it shall be lawful for
the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with such Indian tribe for
the purchase and release by said tribe . . . of such portions of its
reservation not allotted . . .9

Section 5 also expressly designated such lands as were purchased by
the United States to be sold in tracts of 160 acres to "bona fide"9
settlers. Thus, the United States government opened vast new areas
of the West to settlers. Even at 160 acres per Indian, a large surplus
remained available for purchase by the United States. In addition,
after 25 years the difficulties of purchasing individual tracts could be
surmounted and additional acreage made available to white settlers.
Between 1887 and 1934, Indians "sold" an estimated ninety million
acres-an unhealthy figure for a people whose very survival was so
closely tied to the land. Of the remaining forty-eight million acres,
94. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
95. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (§§ 1-4, 5-6, 7, 8, 10-11, codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 348, 349, 381, 339, 341-42 (1970)).
96. Other basic provisions of the act included: (1) The Secretary of the Interior
was authorized to negotiate for the surplus land remaining after the allotment procedure
was completed. (2) Each allotment was to be held in trust by the United States for
25 years or more at the President's discretion. (3) At the end of the trust period,
the United States would issue a fee patent, free of all liens and debts to the allottee.
(4) Individual members of the tribe were to receive full citizenship, subject to civil and
criminal laws of the states. (This was changed by amendment in 1906 to postpone citizenship until the fee patent was issued.) W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS

19 (1966).

97. Public records at the time suggest, however, that leading proponents were
motivated by a desire to substitute white civilization for tribal culture. It was thought
that adherence to tribal ownership prevented Indians from associating to their benefit
with "civilized" society. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 216-17
(1942).
98. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 338, 389-90 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 348 (1970)).
99. Id.
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twenty million acres were desert or semidesert. 10 0
In 1891, Congress recognized the necessity of providing a place
for the some twenty thousand remaining California Indians'' and
passed the Mission Indian Relief Act. 0 2 In general, the act provided
for a commission to survey possible sites for Indian reservations and
to report its findings to the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary
could then issue United States patents in trust to the Indian tribes or
bands for twenty-five years. At the expiration of that time, the United
States could convey all the land to the Indians free from all charges
and encumbrances. 0 3 The act also provided for patents in severalty
with similar restrictions. Pursuant to this act, the Rincon Indian Reservation received its trust patent by presidential order on September
13, 1892,104 the Pechanga Indian Reservation by presidential order' 0 5
and the Cahuilla Reservation by presidential order. 106
In 1905, the "unratified treaties" of 1852 with the California Indians were found in the federal archives.' 0 7 Despite the clear-cut evidence of fraud and misrepresentation, Indians could not sue the federal government at that time without an act of Congress. 08 Not until
1928 did Congress partially remedy that injustice by passing legislation which allowed California Indians to sue for their lost treaty
lands.' 0 9 However, the specific terms of the act restricted any recovery to the land value of $1.25 per acre, a price that was to include
all rights to gold, other minerals, and water. 110 This restriction excluded any recovery for the moral wrong done to the Indians. Nevertheless, a suit was filed by California Indians in 1929,11 but after sixteen years of litigation a judgment of only $17 million was awarded.
During those sixteen years, the federal government argued for and received a $12 million set-off against the judgment. Deductions for the
value of the rancherias and reservations set aside pursuant to the Mis100. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 216 (1942). See note 95 supra.
101. See J. CoLLIER, THE INDIANS OF TH-m AmERcCs 223 (1947).
102. Act of Jan. 12, 1891, ch. 65, 26 Stat. 712.
103. The trust period has been extended indefinitely by the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934. See text accompanying notes 113-18 infra.
104. See text accompanying notes 11-27 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 28-37 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 80-90 supra.
108. J.WISE, THE RED MAN IN Tim NEw WORLD DRAmA 361 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.
1971).
109. Act of May 18, 1928, ch. 624, 45 Stat. 602 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 65157 (1970)).
110. The act also awarded the value of goods, merchandise, services, and facilities
that would have been furnished had the treaties been ratified.
111. NA IvE AMEcICAN RIGHTS FuND,, ANNOUNcEmNTS, No. 4 at 2 (Sept. 1972).
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sion Indian Relief Act as well as the general provisions provided by
the government left the Indians with a settlement of merely $5 million." '
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,113 sometimes referred
to as the Wheeler-Howard Act, reversed the federal policy supporting
the disintegration of tribal properties resulting from the General Allotment Act of 1887.14 The stated purpose of the act was to "conserve
and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the right
to form business and other organizations; to establish a credit system
for Indians; to grant certain rights of home rule to Indians; to provide
for vocational education for Indians; and for other purposes.""' 5 Generally, the act provided that no lands in Indian reservations should be
allotted and that existing periods of trusts on the reservations should
be extended indefinitely." 1 6 Further, section 18 of the act provided
that the act could be rejected by the tribes in an election held within
one year after the act's approval." 7 As one commentator has described the act:
Within a few years the Indians had shown the I.R.A. [Indian Reorganization Act] to be a very successful way of handling their
problems. Large numbers of young people attended college or began work in the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the new Indian
preference hiring system. Tribal governments began substantial
programs in land consolidation and economic development that
were, for the times, advanced and sophisticated. The traditional
religions, now equally protected in their practice with the Christian
112. Indians of California v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 837, 839 (1944) (No. K344).
113. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461
et seq. 1970)).
114. See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
115. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984. The purposes of the act were:
(1) to stop the alienation, through action by the Government or the Indian, of such
lands, belonging to ward Indians, as are needed for the present and future support of
these Indians; (2) to provide for the acquisition, through purchase, of land for Indians,
now landless, who are anxious and fitted to make a living on such land; (3) to stabilize
the tribal organization of Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real,
though limited, authority, and by prescribing conditions which must be met by such
tribal organizations; (4) to permit Indian tribes to equip themselves with the devices
of modern business organizations, through forming themselves into business corporations; (5) to establish a system of financial credit for Indians; (6) to supply Indians
with means for collegiate and technical training in the best schools; (7) to open the
way for qualified Indians to hold positions in the Federal Indian Service. S. REP. No.
1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), cited in F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 84 (1942).
116. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-62 (1970)).
117. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 18, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 478 (1970)).
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denominations, flourished. The reservation became less a prisoner-of-war camp and more a home. The greatest days of Indian

the midst
life in the twentieth century were, strangely enough, in 118
of the greatest depression this nation had ever experienced.

Another beneficial measure enacted under the Roosevelt Administration was the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946.119 Before

1946, each Indian tribe was required to procure an act of Congress
before acquiring standing to sue the federal government. The Indian
Claims Commission Act allowed all tribes to present their claims to

a special United States Indian Claims Commission which would consider elements of fraud and breach of honest dealings in settling con-

troversies. 2 '
The benefits contemplated by this act were frustrated by lengthy
litigation, 2 ' by the use of money as the only means of recovery (as
opposed to receiving land), and the unrealistically low amounts offered as damages. 2 2 By 1951 three groups of California Indians had

filed claims with the commission alleging wrongful dispossession of
their native lands.' 23

three claims resulted in a
Consolidation of the
24

settlement of $29 million, or 470 per acre.1
Termination and Public Law 280

The policy of termination in the early 1950's brought to an abrupt
halt this emerging recognition of federal responsibility for the deceit
and misrepresentation characteristic of the federal government's past
dealings with the Indians. Focusing on termination of exclusive fed-

eral jurisdiction, Congress passed Public Law 280 as a part of a larger
scheme to end federal accountability for Indian affairs.
For thirteen years prior to the passage of Public Law 280, Con118. J. WiSE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 360 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed.
1971).
119. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70
et seq. (1970), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 70(a) et seq. (Supp. II 1972)).

120. Id.
121. "But Justice saw its job as militant defender of United States interests. It
was rarely prepared to go to court against the tribes. Accountants searched the century-old records for any payments in goods or services that the United States had made
to the tribe which could be set off against the tribal claim. The anticipated claims
cases lapsed into struggles between sets of accountants preparing massive memorandums
[sic] listing every blanket, kettle and plow that was ever exchanged between the Indians and the government.
In the nearly twenty-five years of litigation since the creation of the Indian Claims
Commission less than half of the claims have been settled." J. WisE, THm RYD MAN
iN Ta

NEW WoRLD DRAMA 362 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed. 1971).

122.

Id.

123.

NATIvE AMmCAN RIGHTS FUND, ANNOUNCEmENS, No. 4 at 2 (Sept. 1972).

124.

Id.
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gress had intermittently granted limited jurisdiction to five states." 5
In 1952, the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee held hearings to consider whether to
continue granting jurisdiction to the states on an ad hoc basis or whether to enact a comprehensive measure delegating jurisdiction to all the
states. 1 26 In the 1952 Hearings, Dillon S. Myer, then head of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), opposed the move toward a comprehensive delegation of jurisdiction and argued that the BIA should determine the necessity, desirability, and extent of state jurisdiction for
the protection of both the Indians and the local governments. 1 1 No
decision, however, was reached until a year later.
In 1953, the forerunner of Public Law 280 was introduced in
the House to extend California's jurisdiction over the Indian reservations on an ad hoc basis, 2 8 but the committee recommended that
any legislation in this area should be on a general basis, making
provision for all affected States to come within its terms; that the
attitude of the various States and the Indian groups within those
States on the jurisdiction transfer question should be heavily
weighed before effecting transfer; and that any recommended legislation should retain application of Indian tribal customs and ordinances to civil transactions among the Indians, insofar as these
customs or ordinances are not inconsistent with applicable State
29
laws.1
Accordingly, the bill was amended to grant criminal and civil jurisdiction to California, Minnesota,13 0 Nebraska, Oregon,"
and Wisconsin. 1 2 It also provided a procedure for the future assumption of juris-

diction by other states."

3

Although the hearings on this extensive

125. Act of Oct. 5, 1949, ch. 604, 63 Stat. 705 (California given jurisdiction over
the Agua Caliente Reservation); Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1970)) (New York's jurisdiction extended to offenses between or
involving Indians); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa given criminal
jurisdiction over Sac and Fox Reservations); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat.
229 (North Dakota given criminal jurisdiction over Devils Lake Reservation); Act of
June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 217a (1970))

(Kansas

given criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians on Kansas

reservations), repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862 (now covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1970)).
126. Hearings on H.R. 459, 3235, and 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Aflairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on State Legal Jurisdiction
in Indian Country, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11 (1952).

127.
128.
1st Sess.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 25.
H.R. 1063, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953), cited in S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong.,
2-3 (1953).
S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).
Except the Red Lake Band of Chippewa. Id. at 8.
Except the Warm Springs Tribe. Id.

132. Except the Menominee Tribe. Id.
133. Id. at 3.
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measure were not published, the Senate and House reports 3 4 provide
an indication of congressional intent.
In the reports the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs characterized the purposes of its five major areas of legislation affecting Indians, 3 ' of which Public Law 280 was a substantial part, as being twofold:
First, withdrawal of Federal responsibility for Indian affairs wherever practicable; and second, termination of the subjection
of In136
dians to Federal laws applicable to Indians as such.
Additional motives for the legislation were varied. The Senate
and House reports speak of the states' lack of jurisdiction to prosecute
Indians for most offenses committed on Indian reservations, the limited applicability of federal criminal laws, the incapability of tribal organizations to perform law enforcement functions, and, in seeming contradiction, "a stage of acculturation and development that makes desirable extension of State civil jurisdiction to Indian country within their
borders.' 3 7 Motives expressed in support of similar measures suggest
congressional concern for the safety of white citizens living near reservations,'138 drunkeness in the -towns and on the highways, 3 9 and the
states' inability to interfere with the domestic relations of the tribes.' 40
134. S. REP. No. 699 and ILR. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953)
(identical reports).
135. "1. Enactment of legislation terminating Federal responsibility for administering the affairs of Indian tribes within individual States as rapidly as local circumstances will permit. . . . 2. Enactment of legislation terminating Federal responsibility for administering the affairs of individual Indian tribes as rapidly as circumstances
will permit. . . . 3. Enactment of legislation terminating certain services provided by
the Indian Bureau for Indians by transferring responsibility for such services to other
governmental or private agencies, or to the Indians themselves. . . . 4. Enactment of
legislation providing for withdrawal of individual Indians from Federal responsibility,
at the same time removing such individuals from restrictionsand disabilities applicable
to Indians only. . . . 5. Enactment of legislation having as its purpose repeal of existing statutory provisions which set Indians apart from other citizens, thereby abolishing certain restrictions deemed discriminatory." S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
3-5 (1953).
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 5.
138. See Hearings on H.R. 459, 3235, and 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, on State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, 6-9 (1952).
139. See Application of Denetclaw, 83 Ariz. 297, 320 P.2d 697 (1958); Hearings
on H.R. 459, 3235, and 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, at 7 (1952); INsTrrtE OF INDIAN STuDmS, PROGRAM AND
PROCEEDINGS-THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRs, INDIAN PROBLEMS OF
LAw AND ORDER (1957) (University of California, San Francisco).

140. Hearings on H.R. 459, 3235, and 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on State Legal Jurisdiction
in Indian Country, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, at 9 (1952).
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The motives for certain tribes requesting and receiving exemption
from the provisions of Public Law 280 are equally important."'
As
chronicled in the Senate and House reports, the Red Lake Band of
Chippewas voted unanimously against Public Law 280 because they
saw no benefit in the measure to tribal members and no provisions
for an Indian voice in accepting or rejecting the jurisdictional transfer
once the measure passed. The Warm Springs Tribe expressed fear
of inequitable treatment in the state courts as well as the lack of any
benefit to the members in transferring responsibility to a local government financially incapable of assistance. The Colville and Yakima
Tribes voiced similar fears of inequitable treatment in the state courts
and the loss of various rights. The Menominees pointed to their own
effective police force and to a sense of unpreparedness to accept
1 42
subjection to state laws.
The observations of these tribes proved
43
accurate.
very
be
to
The Senate and House reports described the final measure as designed to accomplish the following three purposes:
(1) Confer civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands to
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
(2) Give consent of the United States to states whose present
constitutions expressly disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands to repeal
such disclaimers.
(3) Give consent to all other states to acquire jurisdiction over
criminal offenses or civil causes of action by affirmative legislation
whenever a state should desire to do so.'
The precise language used to enact the first of these three purposes becomes important in construing the intended extent of criminal
jurisdiction over the tribes. 4 5 Section two of the act conferred crimi141. See notes 130-32 supra.
142. S. REp. No. 699, 83d Cong., lst Sess. 7 (1953).
143. See text accompanying notes 160-82 infra.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower also expressed misgivings about the measure as
he approved it with "grave doubts as to the wisdom of certain provisions. Sections
6 and 7 . . . permit other States to impose on Indian tribes within their borders the
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the State, removing the Indians from Federal jurisdiction and, in some instances, effective self-government. The failure to include in these
provisions a requirement of full consultation in order to ascertain the wishes and desires of the Indians and of final Federal approval was unfortunate." Quoted in W.
BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINEss 186 (1966).
144. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1953).

145. Section 4 of Public Law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction and was codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970). Although the provisions were almost identical, subsection
(c) provided additionally that: "Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter

adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise if any authority which
it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be
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nal jurisdiction to the enumerated states and was codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162.
(a) [T]he States or Territories listed in the following table
shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of
the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the
State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country
146
as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
State or
Territory of
California _All

Indian country
affected
Indian country within the
State
Minnesota
All Indian country within the
State, except the Red Lake Reservation
Nebraska
All Indian country within the
State
Oregon
All Indian country within the
State, except the Warm Springs
Reservation
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, belonging
to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held
in trust by the United States or shall authorize regulation of the
use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal
treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.
The disastrous consequences of the federal policy of termination
have outraged many commentators. 47 They point variously to the unwillingness of states, including California,.4 8 to: assume the responsigiven full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to
this section."
146. Indian country in the states of Alaska and Wisconsin has since been added
by amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970).
147. See, e.g., W. BROPHY, & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMmmcA's UNmNISHED
BusiNnss 130-32, 180-213 (1966); A. SoRnIN, AamRicAN IND A~s AND FEDERAL AD
156-61 (1971); . WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEw WoRLD DRAMA 365-70 (V. De-

loria, Jr. ed. 1971).
148. "Mhe American Indians conveyed their property to the United States Government in exchange for the promise of perpetual Federal protection and certain other
benefits; and. . . the tribes vary widely in their educational level, and social and economic development, and many of them would suffer greatly if Federal control and protection of their reservation was terminated. . . ." CAL. SJ. RES. 4 (1954) (memorial-
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bility for Indian Affairs; 149 the invalid assumption that "assimilationby-legislation" is beneficial to Indians; inadequate notice and explanation to the Indians regarding the probable effects of the policy resulting from the lack of Indian participation in the formation of the
policy;1 5 ° BIA indifference to Indian problems after termination; withdrawal of federal services without assurances from the states that
they would assume them; "selfishly interested whites. . . who are totally
unconcerned with the welfare of the Indians or the moral and legal
obligations of the federal government, wanting only to get their hands
upon reservation acres"; 5 ' and the inequities dealt the Menominee,' 5 2
the Klamath,' 5 3 the Colvilles, 5 and the Paiutes, 55 among others.
Congressional recognition of the failure of Public Law 280 and
of the overall policy of federal termination to promote equal status
for Indians was evidenced by the passage of the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968.156 That act repealed section seven of Public Law 280
izing Congress and the President of the United States to refrain from terminating federal control and protection of Indian Reservations), quoted in W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE,
THE INDIAN:

149.

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 192 (1966).

W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 132

(1966).
150. It was explained by Glenn Emmons, commissioner of Indian affairs, that
"consultation" did not necessarily mean "consent": "As trustee, the Federal Government must make the final decision and assume the final responsibility . . . Naturally
the time for consultation was short. But formal statement of Indian views were obtained where possible. Indians were urged to submit any additional comments they
might have directly to the Congressional committees . . . the bills were revised to incorporate all of the suggestions that were considered sound . .
. The bills are certainly not perfect." Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs on Termination of Federal Supervisions Over Certain Tribes of Indians, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 41-42 (1954).
151. W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 191
(1966).
152. Id. at 199-207; J. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 367 (V.
Deloria, Jr. ed. 1971).
153. W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS
196-99 (1966); J. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 367-68 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed. 1971).
154. J. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 369-70 (V. Deloria, Jr.
ed. 1971).
155. W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINEss
193-96 (1966).
156. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 301-22, 401-06, 82 Stat. 73,
78-80 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1311-12, 1321-16, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)).
President Nixon urged Congress to expressly renounce the policy of termination
"[blecause termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because it produces bad
practical results, and because the mere threat of termination tends to discourage greater
self-sufficiency among Indian groups .... ." Message by President Nixon on Americn
Indians, July 8, 1970, reprinted in M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 597, 600
(1973).
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which had allowed any state arbitrarily to assert its jurisdiction over
the reservations.' 57 Instead, the 1968 act made assumption of jurisdiction by the states contingent upon the consent of the tribes at special elections. 15 8 Further, the 1968 act allowed for assumption of jurisdiction on a piecemeal basis to suit the particular needs of the tribes
and the resources of the state. 5 9 The bill represented a partial
remedy for the future, but it did nothing to alleviate the plight of Indians living in states which had already acquired jurisdiction over Indian reservations under Public Law 280.
The state of California was among those states which had already
acquired jurisdiction over Indian reservations under Public Law 280.
Although in 1953 the state had recommended to Congress termination of federal control over California Indian reservations, 60 it quickly
felt the burdens imposed by the premature withdrawal of federal services.'' As chronicled in the 1969 Report to the Governor and the
Legislature by the State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs, 62
the abrupt termination of federal services in the 1950's generated confusion over responsibility for Indian services. The report concluded
that the confusion and inaction "has been a contributing factor to the
of Indian health, education, employment, and econdeterioration
03
omy."'2
In support of this conclusion, the committee's progress report revealed some discouraging statistics. A compilation of various governmental and private surveys of housing and sanitation conditions on
California reservations showed that only 7 to 14 percent of Indian
housing was adequate and up to 90 percent of it was in need of repair
or replacement. 64 Virtually none of the sewage disposal systems examined was found adequate,' 0 5 while the percentage of contaminated
sources of water supply ranged from about 40 percent over all to 71
percent in San Diego County.'8 6 Between 40 and 48 percent of the
157. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403(b), 82 Stat. 73, 79, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970).

158. Id. at § 406, 82 Stat. at 80 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970)).
159. Id. at § 401(a), 82 Stat. at 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1970)).
160. CAL. ASSEMBLY J. RES. No. 38 (June 15, 1953).
161. See note 148 supra.
162. The commission was created by S.B. 1007 in 1961 to help identify and correct the problems of the California Indians. Legislation which would have extended
the commission was defeated in 1969. CALIFORNIA STATE ADviSORY COMMISSION ON
INDIAN AiFIRS, FINAL REPORT TO Tim GovERNOR AND THE LEGISLATuRE 5 (1969).
163. Id. at 9-10.
164. CALIFORNIA STATE ADVISORY COMM'N ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, PROGRESS REPORT
TO THE GoVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE ON INDIANS

AREAS 33 (1966).

165. Id.
166. Id.
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Indians who were living on reservations hauled their own water. 167
Out of the 33 houses which were surveyed on the Rincon Reservation,
only five were found to be adequate. 168 None of the limited number
of houses surveyed on the Pechanga and Cahuilla reservations were
found to be adequate. 169 In all, 87 percent of the homes surveyed
17
were found not to be in conformance with minimum standards.
The fact that the report discovered great amounts of inadequate housing is not surprising in light of the further fact that 70 percent of the
families residing on ten California reservations surveyed were found
to exist on less than $3000 annually, with one-half of these earning
171
less than $1500 per year.
Figures released by the 1970 census 7 2 do not reveal a significant
change in the overall position of the California Indian. The percentage of high school graduates among California Indians living in the
rural portions of the state is about 30.9 percent; the median number
of school years completed, 10.1.17
The median income for Indian
males over 16 is less than $4000 annually. 1 74 About one-half of
the rural Indians own their own homes, but more than half of them
are assessed at less then $15,000.1" 7 The median rent paid per month
by the rest of the rural Indian population is $67.76
The social picture of Indians in California is definitely one of
poverty level incomes, inadequate education and substandard housing.'7 7 It is against this social background that the question of the
167.

Id.

168.
169.

Id. at 93.
Id.

170.

Id.

171. Id. at 9. Additional statistics regarding the problems of the California Indians in the mid-1960's may be found in CAL. DEPT. OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, DIvISION OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, AMERICAN INDIANS IN CALIFORNIA (1965).
172. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL & ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SUBJECT REPORT ON AMERICAN INDIANS (1970).

173.

174.
175.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 132.

176. Id.
177. Additional evidence of the substandard housing available to Indians on California reservations is found in the testimony of California Congressman Harold T.
Johnson in support of an appropriation in the 1972 federal budget to the housing improvement program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: "Conservative estimates made by
independent authorities show that at least nine out of every 10 Indian families living
in the rural areas of California are living in substandard and often deplorable housing.
With an estimate 40,000 Indian people living in the rural areas, this means that 36,000
of them are ill-housed. This is a condition which we cannot tolerate.
In my estimation, it would cost approximately $20 million to solve the Indian
housing needs of the entire State, even if only the most desperate conditions were corrected. This figure covers housing on and off Indian lands. If we turn our attention
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power of counties to enforce their local ordinances on the reservations
becomes crucial. In the Rincon, Ricci and Madrigal cases, the enforcement of the county ordinances effectively halted attempts by reservation Indians to better their condition through -activities which are

legitimate if judged according to the general laws of the state of California, but which are outlawed by the ordinances of the counties. In
Rincon and Madrigal the ordinances halted potential revenue producing schemes. In Ricci, the ordinance literally deprived the Riccis of
their home. The dangers inherent in such a precedent are best illus-

trated by a comparison of the relative costs of housing and income
in Riverside County. Mr. Ricci used about $9,000 worth of raw
materials in the home, but he saved a considerable amount of money
by doing a good portion of the work himself, by drawing up his own

plans (as opposed to paying for an architect's blueprint as required
to get a building permit) and by using plumbing materials which were
less expensive than those mandated by the county code.-7 8 Mr. Ricci's
resources were obviously well beyond those of the average Reservation
Indian earning $4,000 a year. But neither Mr. Ricci nor the $4,000
per year wage earner could realistically hope to build a home in accordance with the county code. 1 9 Building permits, the issuance of

which requires compliance with the code, were granted in Riverside
County according to the latest available figures, for an average asses-

sed valuation of over $25,000 per one unit structure.'

s0

Considering

the unavailability of federal financing and the ineligibility of Indians

on trust property to obtain commercial financing,' 8 the implications

to only those substandard homes, most of which do not anywhere near approach county
housing and health standards, which are located on Rancherias and other Indian trust
lands, we are talking about a minimum of $10 million in housing improvement costs
at today's prices." Hearings on HR. 9417 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Appropriationsfor Dept. of Interior and Related Agencies, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
6, at 115 (1971). See also the testimony of the board of trustees for California Indian
Legal Services. Id. at 383-85.
178. Interview with George Forman, Attorney for California Indian Legal Services, in Berkeley, Cal., Dec. 4, 1973.
179. See COUNTY OF RvERSm, CAL., UNiFoRM BUMING CODE (1970).
180. This figure was reached by dividing the total valuation for one unit structures
in Riverside County ($19,240,000) and San Diego County ($31,497,000) by the number of permits issued for each county-Riverside, 790 and San Diego, 1194. U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SocrAL AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF
THE CENsus, HOUSING AuTHoRIzED y BUILDING PERMITS AND PuBuc CONTRACTS No.

C40-73-8 at 13 (Aug. 1973).
181. "Indian people living on an Indian reservation can't mortgage the land, you
know, so that it's very difficult to get that kind of financing. What you have to do
if you're not working is to depend on the Bureau of Indian Affairs HIP program, the
Housing Improvement Program, for assistance in either constructing or improving an
existing dwelling. The HIP program will give you a maximum of $3500 to acquire
a new dwelling. In today's housing market that's not very much. And they will only
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are obvious. The uniform application of the code inevitably locks Indians residing in Riverside County into substandard housing.

82

Analysis of the Controversy
An analysis of the controversy presented in the cases of Rincon,
Ricci and Madrigal began with an initial determination as to whether

counties in California possess inherent police power jurisdiction;"8 3 the
question then became one of determining the proper application of
Public Law 280. Most of the substantive issues presented to the Ninth
Circuit fell within this second realm of discussion. Following a threshold dispute over the appropriate rules for judicial construction'
of
Public Law 280, three major issues were argued: (1) Are the
county ordinances criminal laws of the state of California within the
meaning of Public Law 280?' s 5 (2) Do the county ordinances conprovide assistance on a house that has a market value of $17,000 maximum. So, you
have to depend on housing programs which will actually construct the house and HIP
has those kinds of programs. Those houses do not always comply with county building
codes." Interview with George Forman, Attorney for California Indian Legal Services,
at Berkeley, Cal., Dec. 4, 1973.
182. The consequences of strict application of the code is graphically, and somewhat humorously, illustrated by the following dialogue from the trial court between a
representative of the county and the court in Ricci v. County of Riverside: "Tim
COURT: First I would like to know from the County: What use can an allottee made
[sic] of his land insofar as living purposes go? Can he live in a tent on the land
if he wants to? MR. BROILES: Yes. THE COURT: How far can he go without violating the statute? Can he build a house that has outside plumbing? MR. BROILES: No,
he could not. He would violate probably the Building Code and if not he would violate, under the ordinance of the County-. THE COURT: Then he can't use his land
unless he complies with the County ordinance to live on it, except living in a tent,
is that what you are saying? MR. BROILES: Well, he can live on it. It depends on
what he is going to be doing with his sewage, where he is going to get his water. Is
he going to have electric power at the site? THE COURT: How is he going to live
on it without complying with the ordinance? MR. BROILES: Live in a tent, I suppose.
R.T.P. 24, 1.9-25, p. 25, 1.1-3." Opening Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Ricci v. County
of Riverside, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
183. Although the issue was briefed only in Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, such a consideration logically precedes acceptance of Public Law
280 as the exclusive focus of the present controversy in all three cases. Opening Brief
for Appellant at 4-5, Brief for Appellee at 4-10, Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-9, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
184. Opening Brief for Appellant at 5-9, Brief for Appellee at 10-15, Reply Brief
for Appellant at 9-10, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 7-11, Brief for Appellee at
11-23, Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-6, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th
Cir. 1974).
185. Opening Brief for Appellant at 9-18, Brief for Appellee at 16-22, Reply Brief
for Appellant at 10-13, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 12-19, Brief for Appellee at
23-30, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
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stitute an encumbrance as prohibited by Public Law 280?186 (3)
Do the county ordinances regulate trust property in a manner inconsistent 7with federal policy, law, or treaty as prohibited by Public Law
280?'8
Inherent Police Power Jurisdiction
The assertion that the counties of California possess inherent
police power jurisdiction over the Indian reservations of the state was
treated in a summary fashion in all three cases illustrated by Judge
Turrentine's statement in Rincon: "Any jurisdiction of San Diego
County to apply its gambling ordinance to Indian trust lands derives
188
...
from a federal statute, Public Law 280.
An examination of the relevant precedents demonstrates the
soundness of this position. As discussed earlier, the United States at
first recognized the Indian tribes as semi-independent, sovereign
people for the purpose of making treaties.18 9 In recognition of that
sovereignty, article 1, section 8, clause 3190 of the United States Constitution vested responsibility for Indian affairs, as it did for all dealings
with foreign nations, with the federal government.' 9 1 Federal judicial
recognition of this exclusive relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes dates back to 1832 and the Supreme Court
case of Worcester v. Georgia.'92 The plaintiff in that case was a missionary living under the sponsorship of the United States on a Cherokee reservation in Georgia. The state of Georgia passed a law requiring all non-Indians living on reservations to procure a special
license from the state. In holding that the state of Georgia had no
186. Opening Brief for Appellant at 23-27, Brief for Appellee at 24-27, Rincon
Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening
Brief for Appellant at 25-34, Brief for Appellee at 30-40, Reply Brief for Appellant
at 8-9, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
187. Opening Brief for Appellant at 18-23, Brief for Appellee at 22-24, Reply
Brief for Appellant at 13-16, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego,
(9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 19-25, Brief for Appellee
F.2d at 40-47, Reply Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Ricci v. County of Riverside, -F.2d
- (9th Cir. 1974).
188. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
373 (S.D. Cal. 1971); see Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law); Madrigal v. County of
Riverside, Civ. No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).

189.
190.

See text accompanying notes 72-92 supra.
"The Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate Commerce with foreign

Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

191. Id.
192. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

"

U.S.
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jurisdiction to pass such a law, the Supreme Court described the Indians as a
distinct community, occupying its own territory . . . in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokee
themselves,193 or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
Congress.

As such, the United States was the only political entity having power
to pass laws affecting Indian land.'
Worcester and an unbroken line
of cases since 1832115 have held that the United States government
has exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian reservations.
Public Law 280 delegated limited criminal and civil jurisdiction
to the states upon this basic premise of exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the reservations. To conclude otherwise would render Public
Law 280 meaningless. Congress could not have delegated power that
it did not possess to states which already possessed that power.
On appeal of Rincon, San Diego County attempted to challenge the
Rincon Band's assertion of exclusive federal jurisdiction by relying on
9 6 In Acosta, a Mission Indian residAcosta v. County of San Diego."
ing on the Pala Reservation sued to establish her rights to county
welfare assistance. In finding for the plaintiff, the California district
court of appeals held that the special jurisdictional relationship between the federal government and the Indians did not preclude the
Indians from meeting state residency requirements for receipt of
county welfare assistance. 197 As the county argued in Rincon, 9 8 the
California appellate court made three observations which seemed to
support the county's argument of inherent police power jurisdiction.
First, the Acosta court observed that Indian reservations are geographically, politically, and governmentally a part of California.' 9 9 Second,
relying on United States v. McBratney,2 °° the court stated that Cali193.
194.
195.
U.S. 478,

Id. at 561.
Id.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1959); Perrin v. United States, 232
482-83 (1914); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886); Ex

parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).

196. 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954). It is interesting to note that
Acosta was referred to in the California State Advisory Commission on Indian Affair's
Final Report to the Governor and the Legislature as an instance when lack of knowledge of what level of government was responsible for Indian Affairs was used as a justification to avoid responsibility for Indian welfare. CALIFORNIA STATE ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INDIAN

AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE

10 (1969).
197. 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 462, 272 P.2d 92, 96 (1954).
198. Brief for Appellee at 5-7, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, -

F.2d -

(9th Cir. 1974).

199. 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 463, 272 P.2d 92, 96 (1954).
200. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
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fornia's jurisdiction extends to all matters which do not interfere with
controls exercised by the federal government over Indian reservations.20 1 Third, the court looked at an anthropological study to question whether early California Indians lived in tribes and thus to question whether the argument against the counties' inherent police power
based upon original sovereignty is valid.20 2
But by extracting these observations from the Acosta case, San
Diego County has misconstrued Acosta as authority for the proposition
that California tribes are subject to the inherent police power jurisdiction of the state of California. While the county offers Acosta to
buttress its claim of police power jurisdiction, the decision actually refutes that claim. The court's first observation that the Indian reservations are geographically, politically, and governmentally a part of California seems irrelevant. Municipal corporations within the county are
also geographically, politically, and governmentally a part of California, but the county does not have jurisdiction over them to enforce
the very ordinance under consideration in Rincon.0 3 One may be a
county resident, but not amenable to county jurisdiction. San Diego
County's second basis of reliance on Acosta was also limited because
the extension of state jurisdiction is expressly limited by the opinion
itself to matters which do not interfere with controls exercised by the
federal government over Indian reservations. If California possessed
inherent police power jurisdiction over reservations, Acosta's recognition of federal pre-emption would be senseless. The Acosta court's
third observation, considering whether California Indians lived as
"tribes" in ancient times, offers no authority for the proposition that
Indians were never an independent, sovereign people. The problems
with that distinction 2 4 is that the Indians occupied the area now called
McBratney, as well as United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), and
Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880), were cited in support of this argument.
Brief for Appellee at 5-7, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego,
F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974). These cases deal, however, with the state's criminal jurisdiction in Indian country over crimes committed in Indian country by non-Indians
against non-Indians. This instance has been distinguished from those in which Indian
interests are involved. Opening Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Rincon Band of Mission
Indians v. County of San Diego, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
201. Acosta v. County of San Diego, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 463, 272 P.2d 92,
96 (1954).
202. Id. at 465, 272 P.2d at 98.
203. Cf. Monterey Club v. Supierior Court, 48 Cal. App. 2d 131, 147, 119 P.2d
349, 357 (1941), cited in Opening Brief for Appellant at 12, 17, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d -(9th Cir. 1974).
204.

In fairness to the authors of THE CALrogNm

INDANs, referred to by the

county, it should be noted that the distinctions drawn, in the book are relative to the
different political organizations found in California in terms of numbers, distinctive
dialects, and military cohesiveness as opposed to that found in Indian groups popularly
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California long before the government of the United States was established. 2 5 After the federal government was formed, it recognized
"tribes" quite easily for purpose of acquiring Indian land by unratified
treaty.20 Finally, the facts of Acosta themselves refute the contention
that the case establishes California's inherent police power jurisdiction.
The case dealt with issues of residency, not jurisdiction:
The fact that the Indians, while residing on Indian reservations,
may be exempt from certain state and county taxes and other

laws is not necessarily determinative of the question of their residence ....
In no case has the enjoyment of such special rights and privileges
served as a justification for the exclusion of any such favored
group from participation in the ordinary rights of citizenship, including the right to equal treatment under state welfare laws.
The issue of whether Indians living on reservations are subject
to
20 7
state laws is not necessarily pertinent to the issue before us.

San Diego County also proffered the act of Congress which admitted California to the Union as another basis for California's fundamental authority over Indian lands.2 °s Because the act admitting
California to statehood did not specifically reserve Indian lands to federal jurisdiction 0 9 and because the treaties of the 1800's were never
ratified by the Senate,2 10 the county urged that the federal government
ceded sovereignty over Indian lands to California. 21 ' This proposition
ignores the principle of federal pre-emption, recognized by cases previously cited in the county's brief.21 2 Further, the cases cited in supThe authors themselves refer to California tribes. R. HEIZER
25-27 (1971).
205. See text accompanying notes 64-71 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 72-92 supra.
Further, it has been expressly recognized by the California court that: "The mere

referred to as tribes.

& M. WHIPPLE, THE CALIFORNIA INDIANS

fact that .

.

. Indians do not have a formal tribal organization . . . is not a sound

basis for distinction, particularly since the absence of such organization is most probably the result of the frequent recognized reversals of federal policy regarding the assimilation of Indians and the encouragement of tribal independence and self-government." Elser v. Gill Net No. One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 30, 38, 54 Cal. Rptr. 568, 575
(1966), cited in Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, -

F.2d -

(9th Cir. 1974).

207. Acosta v. County of San Diego, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 466, 272 P.2d 92,
98 (1954) (emphasis added).
208. This portion of the arguments regarding the county's police power jurisdiction as based on California's admission to the Union was also raised in Brief for Appellee at 7, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974). The arguments
offered in rebuttal to the assertion in Rincon are equally applicable to that in Ricci.
209. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452.
210. See text accompanying notes 80-90 supra.
211. Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, -

F.2d -

(9th Cir. 1974).

212. Id. at 5-7,
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port of this proposition do not even deal with Indian lands.2 13
If, as argued by the Rincon Band, the state has no inherent police
power jurisdiction, Judge Turrentine's conclusion that as a subdivision
of the state, San Diego County possessed no police power jurisdiction
over the reservations seems sound. Therefore, in the absence of any
inherent county jurisdiction, the question is one of the proper construction of the statutory delegation of jurisdiction contained in Public Law
280.
Determining the Proper Rule of Construction
The time-honored rule of statutory construction with respect to
enactments directed towards Indians is that such enactments are to be
liberally construed; doubtful provisions should always be resolved in
favor of the Indians concerned. 214 Chief Justice John Marshall first
enunciated this rule in Worcester v. Georgia:21
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be
construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of which are
susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import,
as connected with the tenor of the 21treaty,
they should be consid6
ered as used only in the latter sense.
One of the most dramatic applications of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to rule against the interests of the Indians was Menominee
Tribe v. United States.21 7 In that case, several members of the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin had been arrested for violating state hunt213. The case of Palm Springs Spa v. County of Riverside, 18 Cal. App. 3d 372,
95 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1971), cited in Brief for Appellee at 8, Rincon Band of Mission
Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974), deals with the state's
ability to tax the leasehold interest in Indian land leased by a non-Indian and specifically denies the state's ability to tax the fee held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of the Indians. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 883. What the case
did suggest, however, was that public lands of the United States are held as by a private
person, except that the land cannot be taxed by the state, nor can the primary disposition be changed. Laws which change or control the use made of the trust land certainly interfere with the primary disposition of trust land as a vehicle by which Indians
may attain economic self-sufficiency, even under this analysis.
In Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930), cited in Brief for Appellee
at 8-9, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir.
1974), the Supreme Court dealt with the state's attempt to tax the business transactions
on a United States military base. In finding that the state could not tax personal property within the camp, the Supreme Court used the example of the restricted application
of state law on Indian reservations. Id. at 651.
214. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); Squire v.
Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
78, 89 (1918); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Celestine,

215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909).
215. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
216. Id. at 582.

217. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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ing and fishing statutes. The arrests had been made pursuant to the
Menominee Termination Act of 1954,218 which provided in part that
"all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their
status as Indians shall no longer be applicable ....
-219 Because
20
the court of claims had held in 1967 that the Treaty of Wolf River
implicitly included the Menominees' right to hunt and to fish without
having to obtain Wisconsin licenses, 221 the state of Wisconsin prosecuted the Menominees for violating Wisconsin hunting and fishing
statutes on the theory that those treaty rights had been abrogated by
the 1954 Termination Act. 2 2 The tribe sued in the court of claims
to recover compensation for their property rights taken from them as
a result of the conviction. In denying recovery, and upholding the
Menominees' hunting and fishing rights, the court of claims held that
because the 1954 Termination Act did not abrogate treaty rights, the
Wisconsin hunting and fishing statute could not be used to prosecute
members of the tribe. 2 3 On petition for writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of claims. Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas first examined the legislative
history of the 1954 Termination Act, including the exclusion of the
initial provisions to protect hunting and fishing rights. 224 He argued
that because the Menominee Reservation was still Indian country at
the time Public Law 280 was passed, the 1954 Termination Act and
Public Law 280 had to be read in pari materia.125 Because Public
Law 280 explicitly preserved the hunting and fishing rights of all Indians, the 1954 Termination Act could not be construed to interfere
with those rights. 22 6 Further, Justice Douglas pointed to the language
of the 1954 Termination Act which referred to the "orderly termination of federal supervision," not to the termination of treaty rights.22 7
This point was buttressed by use of the word "statute" in the 1954
228
act and not the word "treaty.
218. Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, §§ 1-13, 68 Stat. 250 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§9 891-902 (1970)).

219. Id. at § 10, 68 Stat. 252 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 899 (1970)).
220. Treaty with the Menomonee [sic] Indians, May 12, 1854, 10 Stat. 1064
(1854)

(effective Aug. 2, 1854).

221.

Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1002 (Ct. CI. 1967).

222.
223.

State v. Sanapaw, 21 Wisc. 2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41 (1963).
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 988, 1009-10 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

224.
225.

Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408-10 (1968).
Id. at 411. In pari materia indicates "[u]pon the same matter or subject

. .. . Statutes in pari materia are to be construed together."
TIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1951) (citation omitted).
226. 391 U.S. at 411.
227. Id. at 412 (emphasis in original).

BLACK'S LAW Dic-

228. The vigorous dissent of Justice Stewart, in which Justice Black joined, flatly
rejected such reasoning and advocated construction of the Termination Act as it appeared on its face.

391 U.S. at 413-17.
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A more recent example of this rule of judicial construction favoring Indians was the 1973 case of McClanahan v. State Tax Commission.229 There, the Supreme Court based its decision upon this rule
of construction in holding that the Arizona state individual income tax
was unlawful when applied to the income of Navajo Indians which had
'been wholly earned on the reservation.2 30 Clearly, this rule of statutory construction designed to favor Indians remains viable. It is still
being used by the Supreme Court with great flexibility and persuasion
to guard against legislative encroachment on Indian rights.
The district courts in the Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal cases
neither rejected nor adopted the rule of statutory construction; they
simply avoided the question. Nevertheless, the issue of the proper
rule of statutory construction was an important point on appeal.23 1
The appellants in the three cases argued that it is very doubtful
whether Public Law 280 delegated authority to the counties to enforce
their local ordinances on the reservations. By applying this rule of
statutory construction, however, that doubt could have been resolved
by the Ninth Circuit to favor the Indians. That is, the Ninth Circuit
could have construed Public Law 280 as having delegated only jurisdiction of statewide application. Such a construction would prohibit
the application of county ordinances to Indian reservations.2 32
On appeal, the three counties challenged both the appropriateness of applying this rule of construction and the conclusion urged by
the appellants as a result of its application. In Rincon, San Diego
County made four arguments: (1) The 1956 case of Squire v.
Capoeman,2 33 relied on 'by the Rincon Band, required -that a statutory provision which is to be interpreted in favor of the Indians must
be an ambiguous one. 234 The county stated that Public Law 280 contains no doubtful provisions because the language is clear and precise.
(2) Even if some provisions of Public Law 280 are ambiguous, the
county maintained that the Squire case also requires that the interpretation derived from application of the rule must be consistent with
the tenor of the statute as a whole. The county argued that delegation
229. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
230.
231.

Id. at 174-75.
Opening Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Brief for Appellee at 10, Reply Brief for

Appellant at 9, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d(9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 7, Brief for Appellee at 11, Reply
Brief for Appellant at 3-8, Ricci v. County of Riverside, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
232. Opening Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 11,
Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
233. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
234. Id. at 6-7, cited in Brief for Appellee at 10, Rincon Band of Mission Indians
v. County of San Diego, - F. 2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
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of jurisdiction to the county is consistent with the "tenor" of the statute
as revealed in the legislative history, and that the limited grant of jurisdiction urged by the Indians is not.2 35 (3) The cases cited by the
Band as examples of application of the rule were limited to questions
involving the extent of reservation lands or the interpretation of
treaties and hence are not controlling.23 6 (4) Finally, the county
postulated that even if the rule were applied in spite of the first three
objections raised, the narrow construction urged by the Indians would
not be favorable to the Indians because such an interpretation would
deprive Indians of the benefits of local law enforcement as well as
237
the rights and responsibilities of equal citizenship.
In addition to these four arguments raised by San Diego County
in the Rincon2 3 s case, Riverside County in the Ricci case urged the
following two arguments to challenge the application of the rule of
construction suggested by appellant Ricci: (1) The construction
urged by the appellants was specifically rejected in the 1970 case of
People v. Rhoades.239 (2) The application of the rule of construction must be limited strictly to congressional acts related to property
rights.2 4
The first argument advanced by San Diego County in The Rincon
Case, that the language of Public Law 280 is not doubtful, could have
been rejected by the Ninth Circuit for several reasons. First, Public
Law 280 refers explicitly to "laws of the State" and not to "laws of
the county."'2 41 The phrase may be validly interpreted as including
only those laws passed by the legislature of the state or, additionally
by implication, the ordinances of the county because the county is a
political subdivision of the state. 242 It was the county which urged
the Ninth Circuit to infer the second possibility and imply a statutory
delegation beyond the express language of Public Law 280. Hence,
it was the county which must have assumed that the language of Public Law 280 is capable of more than one interpretation. Second, the
lower court in Rincon recognized the two possible interpretations of the
235. Brief for Appellee at 10, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
236. Id. at 11-13.
237. Id. at 14-15.
238. Brief for Appellee at 12, 13, 14-16, 17-23, Ricci v. County of Riverside, F.2d(9th Cir. 1974).
239. 12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 723-24, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794, 796-97 (1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 823 (1971), cited in Brief for Appellee at 12, Ricci v. County of Riverside,
F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
240. Brief for Appellee at 12, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir.

1974).
241.
242.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970).
See text accompanying notes 308-10 infra.
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language of Public Law 280 with reference to laws of the state having
"the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within -the State .
The court observed that such
language might well exclude county ordinances beoause they do not
apply "elsewhere" within -the state.'" Third, Supreme Court Justices
White and Douglas in their dissents in Snohomish expressed doubt
about the appropriate interpretation of Public Law 280.245 Although
such expressions of doubt do not necessarily support either the Indians
or the counties, they do indicate that reasonable men believe that some
doubt exists. Fourth, the Indians, the very interest group which was
purportedly "consulted" in the formulation of Public Law 280 urged
the statute to mean something quite different from the interpretation
urged by the counties. As to the Indians, for whose benefit the
statute was allegedly passed, considerable "doubt exists. '246
San Diego and Riverside Counties' second argument against application of the rule of construction favoring Indians, on the grounds
that to do so would result in an interpretation inconsistent with the
"tenor" of the statute as a whole, could also have been dismissed.
The counties in Ricci and Rincon pointed to the legislative history of
Public Law 280 as an indication of congressional intent (equated, apparently, by the counties with "general tenor") to delegate plenary
jurisdiction to the states and to the counties as political subdivisions
of the state.2 47 It must first be noted that the hearings on Public Law
280 were never published. Therefore, the "legislative history" referred to by the county consisted solely of the House and Senate reports. 248 Even so, not one reference was made in those reports to
the validity of applying county ordinances to Indian reservations. As
noted by the district court in Rincon, the obscure reference to consultation with local officials may indicate congressional contemplation of
the officials merely as enforcement agents for state laws, 249 in that ref*."..-

243.

18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970).

244. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
375 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
245. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22,
cert. denied,389 U.S. 1016 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
246. For a discussion of the lack of understanding surrounding the acceptance of
Public Law 280 by various Indian groups, see text accompanying notes 148-51 supra.
See generally J. WisE, Tan RED MAN IN THE NEw WORLD DRAMA 365-70 (V. Deloria,
Jr. ed. 1971).
247. Brief for Appellee at 17, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Brief for Appellee at 25, Ricci v. County of Riverside, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
248. S. REP. No. 699, H.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).
249. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
374 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
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erence is made only to the need for enforcement of criminal statutes
250
to suppress the violence unchecked by federal officers.
The Indians' position that Public Law 280 represents only a grant
of jurisdiction to state governments from the federal government is
not inconsistent with the legislative history of Public Law 280. On
the contrary, such limited grant of jurisdiction is more internally consistent with the legislative history of Public Law 280 which prohibits
251
the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of federal trust property.
Clearly, these exceptions to the overall delegation of jurisdiction imposed significant limitations on that delegation. Despite the stated objective of Public Law 280 to afford "equal citizenship for Indians,"
an objective relied upon by the counties as indicative of congressional
intent to confer plenary jurisdiction,25 2 Public Law 280's restrictions
preserved the special trust status of the reservations. Therefore, the
"tenor" of the statute may be interpreted as one of a limited grant
of jurisdiction.
The third argument offered by the counties to challenge application of the rule rests on an alleged limitation of this rule of construction to cases involving the extent of reservation land or the interpretation of treaties. But neither the Supreme Court nor the California
court of appeals has observed such limitations. In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 253 the Supreme Court applied the liberal rule
of construction to compel the removal of fish traps owned by nonIndians located outside the boundaries of the reservation which depleted the fishing resources of the reservation. 254 In Choate v.
Trapp,25 5 the Supreme Court applied the principle of statutory construction favoring Indians in holding that the state of Oklahoma could
not tax lands designated as tax free by federal statute, even though
one possible statutory interpretation would have allowed the state to
do so. The precise language issued by the Supreme Court in Choate
in applying the rule to interpret the federal statute in a manner favorable to the Indians stresses the rule's applicability to federal treaties
and statutes.25 6 Clearly, Public Law 280 is also a federal statute for
purposes of this rule of statutory construction.
One California court of appeals has applied this rule of construc250. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).
251.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970).
252. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953). See also Brief for Appellee
at 15, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir.

1974).
253.
254.
255.

248 U.S. 78 (1918).
Id. at 89-90.
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).

256.

Id. at 675.
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tion in the case of Elser v. Gill Net No. One. 57 In an opinion by
Justice Taylor, the court ruled that California's Fish and Game Code
which regulates the maximum size for fish nets was not applicable to
two Klamath Indians caught fishing with nets whose dimensions exceeded the legal maximum. California had tried to limit the operation
of Public Law 280's protection of fishing rights to those Indians living
within tribal settings formally established by treaty. The court explicitly refused to allow such a distinction to be made based on the absence of ratified treaties establishing reservations for the Indians of
258
California.
The fourth argument raised by the counties asserted that a narrow construction of Public Law 280 which would prohibit the exercise
of jurisdiction over the reservations would not be favorable to the Indians. The counties suggest that the Indians of California would be
deprived of the protections of county law enforcement as well as the
rights and responsibilities of equal citizenship. Such apprehensions,
however, are not supported factually.
With regard to the purported loss of protections of county law
enforcement, local officials will always have the duty of enforcing the
general criminal and civil laws applicable throughout California. 5 9
Prohibiting the enforcement of county ordinances on the reservations
would simply relieve Indians from complying with laws which reflect
merely local standards and preferences which often are far different
from the standards and preferences held by Indians on the reserva260
tions. For example, as discussed earlier with respect to housing,
it often happens that purported protections actually harm Indian interests. That is, enforcing county building codes locks Indians on the
reservations into substandard housing because the codes require that
any new house (however much an improvement over the old) must
measure up to minimum county standards. 2 6 ' More often than not
that requires a financial outlay far beyond the financial resources of
the Indians."' 2 If carried to the extreme, rigidly applying the code
in all possible instances on the reservations would leave about 80 percent of the Indians homeless. 263 Rather than ensuring adequate
health and safety standards on the reservations, enforcing the codes
257. Elser v. Gill Net No. One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 30, 54 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1966).
258. Id. at 38, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
259. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
374 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
260. See text accompanying notes 177-82 supra.
261. RrvEnsmE CoUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE 457, UNIFORM BuIL.ING CoDE, § 3(F),
September, 1970.
262. See text accompanying notes 178-80 supra.
263. See text accompanying notes 164-67 supra.
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would make any effort to improve the living standard in accordance
with the resources of the reservation virtually impossible.
With regard to the purported deprivation of full and equal citizenship, Judge Turrentine in Rincon appeared to give great weight to the
stated purpose of the Congress in passing Public Law 280 "to permit
the Indians to become full and equal citizens of their respective states
and to terminate the wardship of the federal government over their
affairs." 264 The laudable goal of equal citizenship was employed by
Judge Turrentine to construe two ambiguous aspects of Public Law
280 as supporting the extension of the county's jurisdiction over the
Rincon Band's reservation. First, he stated that the
reference to local authorities (with respect to those persons consulted by the Congress in passing Public Law 280), taken together
with the purpose of the legislation to make Indians full and equal
citizens, suggests that the local governments would assume the
same role in relation to Indian
citizens as they occupy with respect
2 65
to other citizens of the state.
Second, Judge Turrentine attempted to overcome the requirement that
the laws of the state shall apply on the reservations as they apply
elsewhere with the state2 60 by concluding that "it is more reasonable
to conclude that this phrase was inserted to assure equal treatment
of the Indians with all other citizens and not to exempt Indian lands
from local laws. 2617 Because the concept of equal citizenship held
such great importance for Judge Turrentine on these key issues, the
validity of that concept with reference to the extension of county jurisdiction deserves very careful consideration.
Judge Turrentine quoted a significant passage from the House
report to prove that "full and equal citizenship" was the primary legislative intent underlying Public Law 280:
This legislation, whether before the House or presently under committees consideration, has two coordinate aims: First, withdrawal
of Federal responsibility for Indian affairs wherever practicable;
and second, termination of the subjection
of Indians to federal
268
laws applicable to Indians as such.
What Judge Turrentine failed to note, however, was that this passage
did not precede a discussion of state versus federal jurisdiction, but
a list of five diverse measures which the committee believed should
264. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
374 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
265. Id.
266. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970).
267. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
375 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
268. Id. at 374.
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be considered by Congress to accomplish these aims. 269 The report
refers to many pieces of legislation actually designed to terminate the
trust status of individual tribes within certain states, 27 0 as well as complete termination of all the tribes within specified states,2 71 including
California, as opposed to Public Law 280 which dealt only with a limited delegation of jurisdiction. These measures, however, were only
contemplated at the time Public Law 280 was enacted. 272 At least
with respect to California, less than one percent of the total trust land
acreage had been terminated2 73 before the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 brought unilateral termination by the federal government to an
abrupt halt. 4 Therefore, passage of Public Law 280 was not coterminus with "equal citizenship" in the sense that all the restrictions and
protections of federal trust status were removed by that measure. On
the contrary, Public Law 280 expressly provided for prohibitions
against the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal
property in a manner inconsistent with any federal treaty, agreement,
or statute or the deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity with
respect to hunting, trapping or fishing. 75 These prohibitions would
be meaningless if Public Law 280 has been enacted for the purpose
of removing all federal protections. If Indians must now accept all
the responsibilities of citizenship within the county that would surely
include a county property tax. But, Public Law 280 did not remove
the trust status of the California reservations; on the contrary, it
granted only a limited amount of jurisdiction to the state. Whatever
the overall purpose of the general policy of termination may have
been, that purpose would seem insufficient to justify an expanded interpretation of provisions of an expressly limited statute to encompass
the full range of objectives outlined in pieces of legislation which
never received congressional approval.
In Ricci, these four arguments were advanced by Riverside
County with the previously mentioned addition of two points: (1)
The interpretation of the rule of construction advocated by Ms. Ricci
269. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1953). See text accompanying notes 135-136 supra.
270. Individual tribes slated for termination were the Flatheads of Montana, the
Klamath of Oregon, the Menominee of Wisconsin, the Osage of Oklahoma, the Potawatomie of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Chippewa's on the Turtle Mountain Reservation of North Dakota. H.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1953).
271. Reference is made to actual termination by separate legislation of tribes in
California, Florida, Iowa, New York, and Texas. Id.
272. Id.
273. CALIFoRNIA STATE AWvisoRy COMM'N ON INDiAN AFFiRms, FINAL REPORT TO
TE GOVERNOR AND THE LEaisLATuRa 10 (1969). See text accompanying notes 15659 supra.
274. Id.
275. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970).
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was specifically rejected by the California court of appeals in People
v. Rhoades.2 76 (2) Application of the rule must be limited to acts
of Congress which relate strictly to property rights.
People v. Rhoades involved an Indian living on the Big Bend
Rancheria in Shasta County. Rhoades had been convicted of violating
section 4291 of the California Public Resources Code 277 which requires any person who owns or controls any building in, upon, or adjoining forest covered lands to maintain a firebreak of a specified
width around the building by removing flammable growth. In affirming the misdemeanor conviction, the California court of appeals held
that section 4291 was properly enforced against Indians on reservations by virtue of the jurisdiction delegated to the state from the federal government by Public Law 280.278 But the Rhoades case dealt
not with a county ordinance, but with the application of a law of the
state of California, which is clearly applicable to all California Indians
on all reservations in the state according to the terms of Public Law
280.
The counties, therefore, were offering no case authority to reject
the application of the rule of favorable construction to Public Law 280.
Activating this rule is crucial to the Indians' cases in the Ninth Circuit.
If the lower courts had utilized this rule in arriving at their decisions,
those decisions would have favored the Indians and not the counties.
The following discussion of the three major issues of statutory interpretation which confronted the Ninth Circuit will demonstrate the difference which application of this rule at the trial level would have
made in these three cases.
The three issues of statutory interpretation presented to the Ninth Circuit
by Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal
The Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal cases presented three basic issues
of statutory interpretation: (a) What is a "criminal law of the State"
within the meaning of Public Law 280? (b) What constitutes an
"encumbrance"? (c) What is a "regulation of trust property inconsistent with federal statute, treaty, or regulation"?
The Rincon decision was the only one of the three cases which
has been published. The Ricci and Madrigal decisions were not published; the opinions in those two cases contained only findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Judge Turrentine's reasoning in Rincon can
serve as a vehicle for discussing all the cases because the three issues
of statutory construction in all of the cases are virtually identical.
276.

12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1970).

277.

CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 4291 (West 1972).

278.
(1970).

People v. Rhoades, 12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 723-24, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794, 796-97
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What is a "criminallaw of the State" within
the meaning of Public Law 280?

The delegation of criminal jurisdiction by the federal government
in Public Law 280 to the state government is phrased as follows:
Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall
have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in
the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State
or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territoryhas jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have else279
where within the State or Territory.

The appellants in Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal argued in the Ninth

Circuit that the county ordinances were not "laws of the State" within
the meaning of Public Law 280 and were therefore not applicable to

the Indians residing on reservations. 2 0

The district courts, however,

held that county ordinances were included in the statutory delegation
of jurisdiction.281 Judge Turrentine in Rincon observed that there are
no authoritative cases which have interpreted Public Law 280.282 He
based his discussion on this statutory issue on the following five reasons: (i) A purported acceptance of county ordinances as laws of
the state in Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal.283 (ii) An in-

ferred congressional contemplation of county ordinances within Public
Law 280 based upon the stated congressional purpose of equal citizenship for Indians in conjunction with reference in the Senate and House

reports to consultation with unidentified "local officials."2

4

(iii)

A

279. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
280. Opening Brief for Appellant at 9-18, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 12,
Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
281. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
378 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law); Madrigal v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions
of law).
282. 324 F. Supp. at 378.
283. 70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967), cited in
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D.
Cal. 1971). Snohomish involved an Indian tribe which leased two allotments to a nonIndian disposal company for use as a garbage dump. The county sought to enjoin the
use of the site for failure to obtain a conditional use permit as required by county ordinance. In holding the county ordinance inapplicable on the reservation the Snohomish court based its decision on an expanded definition of an "encumbrance" to include
county zoning ordinances. Although the Rincon court rejected that expanded definition, it pointed to the Snohomish court's failure to discuss whether the county zoning
ordinance qualified as a "criminal law of the State" as an implicit acceptance of the
county ordinance as, in fact, a "criminal law of the State." See text accompanying
notes 21-27 supra.
284. 324 F. Supp. at 374.
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conclusion that the phrase in Public Law 280 which refers to laws having force and effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State was inserted to assure equal treatment of Indians. 5 (iv)
The California Supreme Court decision of In re Hubbard,2 8 6 which
held that California had not pre-empted the field of gambling regulation and, consequently, that additional legislation is a proper subject
for local ordinances.2 87 (v) The assertion that local governments
are qualified to render fair treatment to all of their citizens, and thus
to exclude Indians from local county jurisdiction would be to deny
them the benefits of full and equal citizenship. 88
On appeal, the parties clarified, narrowed, and to some extent
restructured the issues surrounding the discussion, so that a review of
the arguments was more useful for purposes of analysis than strict adherence to the format suggested by Judge Turrentine in Rincon. On
appeal, the Rincon Band and San Diego County offered a wide variety
of authorities which tended respectively either to reject or establish
county ordinances as "criminal laws of the State." A brief review of
these arguments will illustrate the broad spectrum of opinion.
The Rincon Band's basic argument for excluding county ordinances
from the delegation of jurisdiction granted in Public Law 280 was
premised on a common sense reading of the statute. Because county
ordinances are enforceable by county officials only within the county,
'
they do not apply "elsewhere within the State"289
and hence should
not have any effect within the reservation. To buttress this position,
the Indians pointed to Menominee Tribe v. United States, 90° discussed
above and Kennerly v. District Court.29 1 In Kennerly, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the Montana courts lacked jurisdiction
to hear an action brought against members of the Blackfoot Indian
Tribe to recover a debt owed a grocery store located on the reservation.29 2 Despite the enactment by the Blackfeet of a tribal law providing that the tribal court and the state courts should have concurrent
285. Id. at 375.
286. 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
287. Id. at 127, 396 P.2d at 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
288. 324 F. Supp. at 375.
289. Opening Brief for Appellant at 14, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
290. 391 U.S. 404 (1968), cited in Opening Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Rincon
Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening
Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
291. 400 U.S. 423 (1971), cited in Opening Brief for Appellant at 6, 15-16; Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, F.2d (9th Cir. 1974);
Opening Brief for Appellant at 10, 15, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d (9th
Cir. 1974).
292. 400 U.S. at 430.
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jurisdiction over all actions in which the defendant was a member of
the tribe, the United States Supreme Court refused to allow such an
extension of state jurisdiction in the absence of affirmative assumption
of jurisdiction by the Montana state legislature. 293 The cases were
cited by the Rincon Band as authority for the proposition that courts
must strictly construe any purported extension of state jurisdiction over
Indian country.2 94 In addition, the Band agreed that county or municipal gambling ordinances 295 are properly matters of local legislative
concern; 29 6 however, they argued vigorously that gross inequities result
from the application of county laws to reservations.297 The inequities
are attributable to the fact that other persons living in a community
may incorporate themselves as a municipality empowered to enact
ordinances in line with local preferences and free themselves from
compliance with county ordinances. Indians living on reservations,
however, are unable to incorporate themselves according to the laws
of California. Therefore, a strict interpretation of Public Law 280 is
necessary to avoid placing the Indians in a position unequal to that
298
of other citizens. Finally, the Indians offered Moody v. Flowers
293. Id. at 427.
294. Opening Brief for Appellant at 6, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County
of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); accord, Opening Brief for Appellant at 10,
Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
295. By analogy, one might also concede that the county building code in Ricci
and the rock festival ordinance in Madrigal are properly matters of local legislative
concern,.
296. In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 125, 396 P.2d 809, 813, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
397 (1964), cited in Opening Brief for Appellant at 17, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 16, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d -(9th Cir. 1974).
297. See text accompanying notes 164-82 supra. See generally Opening Brief for
Appellant at 15-16, Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th
Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Ricci v. County of Riverside, F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
298. 387 U.S. 97 (1967). Moody v. Flowers involved interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970) which provides that: "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of any State statute by restraining
the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute
or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of
the unconstitutionality of such a statute unless the application therefor is heard and
determined by a district court of three judges under Section 2284 of this title." In an
attack on state statutes alleged to cause malapportionment in the establishment of local
units governed by elected bodies, the Supreme Court held that a three judge court was
improperly convened under section 2281 because the challenged statute was one of limited application concerning only one county. "The term 'statute' in § 2281 does not
encompass local ordinances or resolutions." 387 U.S. at 101, cited in Reply Brief for
Appellant at 11, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d
(9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
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and Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project299 as cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has specifically construed the
term "state statute" included within a federal statute as excluding local
ordinances. Two recent district court cases in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits offer additional support for the argument that federal enactments which refer to "state laws" may not be considered as including
local ordinances. The Fifth Circuit case of Donelon v. New Orleans
Terminal Co."' held that local ordinances may not be validly included
as state laws within the meaning of the Railroad Safety Act of 1964.
In Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,30 1 decided after Rincon, the district court cited Donelon and stated by way of dicta that
Public Law 280 "refers to state laws that are of 'general application'
and does not include these county ordinances within its scope. 3 °2
San Diego County offered five arguments to prove that county
ordinances must be regarded as "laws of the State" within the meaning
of Public Law 280. First, the county argued and Judge Turrentine
found, that implicit in the Snohomish decision is the assumption that
county ordinances are laws of the state. 3 Second, the county argued
that companion legislation whose congressional history explicitly refers
to local laws evidences congressional intent to include county ordinances within the meaning of Public Law 280.101 Third, the county
299. 404 U.S. 541 (1972). This was an action brought against the Board of Regents of the University of Texas to enjoin enforcement of rules restricting solicitation
on campus as unconstitutional. In holding that a three judge court was improperly
convened, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the Board of Regents had jurisdiction only over campuses in a few parts of the state, the rules did not come under the
definition of "state statute." The term state statute did not encompass local ordinances
nor state statutes having only local impact. Id. at 545, cited in Reply Brief for Appellant at 11, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th
Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 15, Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d
(9th Cir. 1974).
300. 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1973).
301. Civ. No. F-836 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions
of law).
302. Id. at 6.
303. Brief for Appellee at 16, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
304. Brief for Appellee at 17, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, - F.2d (9th Cir. 1974). The companion legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 1161
(1970), provided an exception to the application in Indian Country of Indian liquor
laws if to do so would be in conformity with laws of the State and tribal ordinances.
The legislative history explains: "In other words, if this bill is enacted, a State or local
municipality or Indian tribes, if they desire, by the enactment of proper legislation or
ordinance, to restrict the sales of intoxicants to Indians, they may do so." S. REP.
No. 722, 2 U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News 2399-2400 (1953).
The Indians counter this argument, however, by pointing to the fact that while
the Senate report does refer to local ordinances, the House report does not. Reply
Brief for Appellant at 12, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego,
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cited several California cases which held that various county and city
ordinances, which are enacted pursuant to the police power jurisdiction of article X, section 7 of the California Constitution, 0 5 aid the
state's general statutes. 30 6 Fourth, the county argued that it is actually

recognized as a subdivision of the state by the California Constitu-

tion, 0 7 under Government Code section 23000808 and a long line of

California cases.

09

Fifth, the county stated that an "ordinance en-

acted by virtue of power for that purpose delegated by the legislature
of the state, is a state law within the meaning of the Federal Constitution," 310 under the Supreme
Court case of Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
311
v. City of Goldsboro.
On the basis of these five arguments, it is clear that San Diego

County attempted to show that in some instances county ordinances
are given the force of state law. However, the arguments by the
county based on California cases (not controlling in federal court) and
-

F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
The argument can, in addition, be turned around to evidence congressional contemplation of the applicability of local ordinances. The absence of such reference in the
legislative history of Public Law 280 would then indicate congressional intent not to
include local ordinances in that statute.
305. In re Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 649-650, 226 P. 914, 921 (1924), People v. Cannizzaro, 138 Cal. App. 28, 37, 31 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1934), cited in Brief for Appellee
at 18, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir.
1974).
306. In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
399 (1964); In re Portnoy, 21 Cal. 2d 237, 239, 131 P.2d 1, 2 (1942); Remner v.
Municipal Court, 90 Cal. App. 2d 854, 856-57, 204 P.2d 92, 94, appeal dismissed, 338
U.S. 806 (1949).
307. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cited in Brief for Appellee at 18, Rincon Band of
Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
308. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 23000 (West 1968) states: "A county is the largest political division of the State having corporate powers." Brief for Appellee at 18, Rincon
Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
309. County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 625, 627, 59 P.2d 139, 141
(1936); Blum v. City and County of San Francisco, 200 Cal. App. 2d 639, 643, 19
Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1962); Watson v. Los Altos School Dist., 149 Cal. App. 2d 768,
772, 308 P.2d 872, 875 (1957), cited in Brief for Appellee at 18-19, Rincon Band of
Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
310. Brief for Appellee at 19, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
311. 232 U.S. 548, 555 (1914). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLiTr
OF LAWS § 3, comment b at 6 (1969), cited in Brief for Appellee at 19, Rincon Band
of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
It could be argued in rebuttal that there is no delegated power from the state to
counties to pass gambling ordinances, but that such ordinances are matters of purely
local concern. Hence, Atlantic would be distinguished as dealing with an instance
wherein the state legislature specifically delegated powers to a municipal corporation.
Reply Brief for Appellant at 12, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
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other cases which do not deal with the interpretation of Public Law
280 or any other federal statute dealing with Indians (except the references to the cases of Ricci and Madrigal) do not refute the precise
language of the statute itself which speaks specifically of laws which
apply "elsewhere within the State."
In evaluating the arguments of the county against the precise language of the statute, several factors must be considered. First, the
congressional history of Public Law 280 fails to address the alleged
inclusion of county ordinances within the meaning of Public Law 280.
Second, a strict construction was given to the statutes purporting to
enlarge jurisdiction over Indian reservations in Menominee and Kennerly. Third, social and economic inequities would result from such
an extension. Fourth, there are the cases which held that county ordinances are not state statutes. Fifth, the federal district courts in California have split on what constitutes a "law of the state" as evidenced
by Santa Rosa Rancheria v. Kings County.112 Sixth, one must also
examine the weight given by Judge Turrentine in Rincon to what was
not said in the Snohomish case (in order to reach a result in opposition to the actual holding) and the erroneous interpretation of congressional intent with its allegedly beneficent goals of equal citizenship.
The lower courts in all three of these cases failed to apply the
judicial rule of statutory construction favoring Indians. That omission
was crucial; if the judges had done so, the rule would have required
the district courts to strike a different balance of the above factors
and render decisions favorable to the Indians to the effect that county
ordinances are beyond the scope of delegated jurisdiction contained
in Public Law 280.
What constitutes an encumbrance?
In its delegation of both criminal and civil jurisdiction, Public Law
280 provides that nothing in that statute should "authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe."3'13 The controversy here centers
around the proper definition of an "encumbrance." As defined in
Black's Law Dictionary, an encumbrance is "any right to, or interest
in, land which may subsist in another to the diminution of its value,
but consistent with the passing of the fee. ' 314 The Indians in all three
cases pointed to the decision in Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal
Co. 315 to support their position that the application of the county ordi312. Civ. No. F-836 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 12, 1973).
313. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970).
314.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (4th ed. 1951).

315.

70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
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nance would constitute an encumbrance in violation of the express
prohibition against encumbrances contained in Public Law 280.316
Snohomish expanded the usual definition of an encumbrance to include "any burden upon land depreciative of its value, such as a lien,
easement, or servitude, which though adverse to the interest of the
3 17
landowner, does not conflict with his conveyance of the land fee."
This expanded definition thus made it possible for the court in Snohomish to hold that the city of Seattle could not require the lessee
of an Indian allotment to obtain a conditional use permit to operate
a garbage dump.31 8 The district courts in Rincon, Ricci, and Madrigal
refused to adopt the broad definition used in Snohomish and held that
neither the county gambling ordinance,31 9 nor the county building
code320 nor the county rock festival ordinance constituted an encumbrance.3 21 The Rincon court, for example, stated that it found "no
warrant for expanding the definition of encumbrance as that term appears in Public Law 280 beyond its usual application indicating a burden on the land imposed by third persons which may impair alienability of the fee, such as a mortgage, lien or easement. 3 22 Thus, the
three district court judges adopted the more narrow definition found
in People v. Rhoades.12 1 In Rhoades, the California district court of
appeal expressly refused to adopt the definition of an encumbrance
used in Snohomish.3 2 4 In Rhoades, the defendant, an Indian living
on the Big Bend Rancheria, was convicted of violating section 4291
of the California Public Resources Code which requires any person
who owns or controls any building in, upon or adjoining forest-covered
lands to maintain a firebreak of a specified width around the building
by removing all flammable growth. The court in Rhoades ruled that
Public Law 280 gave criminal jurisdiction to the state but prohibited
imposition of any type of encumbrance on the land. Then, the court
in Rhoades found that enforcement of the state code would not place
316. Opening Brief for Appellant at 23, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974); Opening Brief for Appellant at 28,
Ricci v. County of Riverside, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
317. 70 Wash. 2d at 672, 425 P.2d at 26.
318. Id.
319. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 342 F. Supp. 371,
376-77 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
320. Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal., Aug. 5,
1971).
321. Madrigal v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16,
1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
322. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
376 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
323. People v. Rhoades, 12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1970).
324. Id. at 299.
325. Id. at 724, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
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.impairing power

of alienation 321 and that Congress could not have intended Public
Law 280 to exempt Indians from
complying with the laws designed
326
to protect the state's forest land.

On appeal, the Indians in Rincon, Ricci and Madrigal reasserted
their contention that the broad definition in Snohomish should be
adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Again, taking the arguments in Rincon
as illustrative of all three, the Band cited cases whose definitions of
an encumbrance more closely parallel the Snohomish definition than
the definitions which the counties are using.
In Kirkwood v. Arenas,s2 7 the federal district court defined an
encumbrance as "any right to, or interest in, land which may subsist
in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the estate of the
tenant, but consistently with the passing of the fee. 328 In that case,
a lien had been impressed upon the allotment of a deceased member
of the Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians for payment of attorney
fees. Certain portions of the land had been sold, and the remnants
had been placed in the registry with the same restrictions which had
been placed on the entire parcel of land. The state of California
sought to impose an inheritance tax on the remaining land. In holding that the allotment lands were tax exempt, the court construed section 5 of the Mission Indian Relief

At 320

in light of congressional in-

tent to encourage development of the reservation to the point of selfsufficiency. At that time, the patent in fee3 3 ° would pass to the Indians completely free of any rights or controls by third persons in the
nature of an encumbrance. Thus, imposing the state inheritance tax
would run contrary to that intent. 3 '
In Fraser v. Bentel, 332 an action on foreclosure of a mortgage,
the California Supreme Court held that restrictions against the use of
firearms were an encumbrance within the meaning of California Civil
Code section 1114. The court in Fraser defined an encumbrance as
"any right to or interest in land which may subsist in third persons
to the diminution of the value of the estate to the tenant, but consistently with the passing of the fee. 33 3
326. Id. at 725, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
327. 243 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1957).
328. Id. at 867.
329. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
330. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
331. 243 F.2d at 869.
332. 161 Cal. 390, 119 P. 509 (1911).
333. Id. at 394, 119 P. at 511. Yet another definition used by courts in California is "whatever charges, burdens, obstructs, or impairs itsuse or impedes itstransfer."
Johnson v. Bridge, 60 Cal. App. 629, 632, 213 P. 512, 513 (1923).
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The Supreme Court in United States v. Rickert,33 4 examined the
attempt by Roberts County in South Dakota to collect taxes on improvements made by members of the Sissiton Band of Sioux Indians
on their allotments. In refusing to allow the tax, the Court relied on
the provisions of the General Allotment Act"' which promised to return the land to the Indians free of all encumbrances as well as the
federal policy of encouraging the development of reservation land. 3 6
Although the three cases which have been cited by the Indians
involved interests more generally regarded as encumbrances-tax
liens, restrictive covenants, and improvement taxes-all three cases
defined an encumbrance broadly. In so defining an encumbrance,
these decisions stressed the effect the interest involved would have on
the use and enjoyment of the land. In Kirkwood and Rickert, the
courts gave careful consideration to the effect the interest would have
on the legislative intent to benefit Indians in the Mission Indian Relief
Act and the General Allotment Act. Similarly, the Indians argued,
the three ordinances involved in Rincon, Ricci and Madrigal have a
detrimental effect on the profitable use of Indian lands set aside by
the federal government for the purpose of providing a livelihood for
the Indians. These factors might well have led the Ninth Circuit to
adopt the broad definition of an encumbrance found in Snohomish.
Do the county ordinancesregulate trust property in a
manner inconsistent with federal statutes?
Sections 2(b) and 4(b) of Public Law 280 provide: "Nothing
in this section shall authorize. . . regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto ....
,,337 "Such
property" refers to property belonging to any Indian or any Indian
tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States. 3' 38
This type of arrangement has been described as one in which the Indian
receives what is called a 'trust patent,' the theory being that the
United States retains legal title to the land. Alienation of the
land, therefore, requires either the consent of the United States
to the alienation or, as a prerequisite to a valid conveyance, the

issuance of a fee patent.

.

..

339

Such is the arrangement by which the land involved in Rincon, Ricci,
and Madrigal is held.340 Therefore, the protections against regula334.
335.
336.
337.

188 U.S. 432 (1903).
See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
Id. at 436-37.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S..C § 1360(b) (1970).

338.

Id.

339. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 109 (1958).
340. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
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tion of land in these cases in a way which would frustrate federal action to provide an economic resource for the Indians are properly
applied.
In Rincon, Ricci and Madrigal the district courts rejected the Indians' argument that the county ordinances in each case regulate trust
property in a manner inconsistent with federal law. 3 41 In Rincon,
Judge Turrentine first pointed out that the county's gambling ordinance regulated "conduct" of persons, not the use of trust property;
hence, the restriction did not apply. 4 2 Second, he found that the expressions of deference to tribal customs and laws in section 4(c) of
Public Law 280343 applied exclusively to civil laws and could not
therefore be used as evidence of a conflict "between the [criminal]
ordinance and federal policy toward the Indians to allow their independence and to encourage their economic self-sufficiency.

'3

4

The

4
district courts in Ricci and Madrigal reached similar conclusions.1 1
Again taking Rincon as an example on appeal, the Band urged
the Ninth Circuit to look at the regulatory effect of the ordinance on
land use, not the criminal sanctions placed on violations of those regulations . 4 6 The Band reasoned that the expressed intent of Public

341. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
378 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal.,
Aug. 5, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law); Madrigal v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
A major portion of the Rincon court's rejection of this argument dealt with the
validity of an administrative regulation of the Secretary of the Interior, 25 C.F.R. §
1.4 (1965). That regulation adopted the zoning laws of the state of California, but
withheld approval of city and county regulations for "separate action." The Rincon
Band argued below that such a regulation explicitly precluded application of the
county's ordinance because the Secretary had not yet adopted the county regulations
of San Diego County. Judge Turrentine discounted such reasoning on two grounds.
First, he decided that "[a]s the court has decided that this gambling ordinance is not
a law regulating the use of property, the administrative regulation by its terms is inapplicable to this controversy." 324 F. Supp. at 378. Additionally, he found that because the regulation was merely an interpretation of existing law, it was fully reviewable by him.
The proper force which ought to be given to the regulation is beyond the scope
of this note. Therefore, the arguments involved in this statutory issue are not premised
on either an acceptance or rejection of the district court's decision as to the force of
the regulation.
342. 324 F. Supp. at 377.
343. See note 145 supra.
344. 324 F. Supp. at 378.
345. Ricci v. County of Riverside, Civ. No. 71-1134-EC (C.D. Cal., Aug. 5,
1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law); Madrigal v. County of Riverside, Civ.
No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
346. San Diego County's distinction in Rincon seems particularly weak because
the San Diego County ordinance punishes the "letting of property for any gambling
purpose," but does not proscribe the gambling itself. See note 16 supra.
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Law 280 to protect tribal laws and customs was virtually meaningless
if the Ninth Circuit permitted the county to ignore that intent merely
by placing a criminal penalty on the conduct involved. Any land use
activity involves some type of conduct by the person using the land.
If the provisions of Public Law 280 were construed according to their
plain meaning, the provisions purport to protect Indian properties from
outside interference with the use of trust lands. Clearly, an ordinance
which does not allow Indian occupants to conduct a cardroom interferes with the use of the land.147 In short, if some types of criminal
conduct were not recognized by Congress as potentially interfering
with the use of trust property, why was the phrase exempting reservations from such interference placed in a measure dealing with criminal
jurisdiction as well as civil jurisdiction? Plainly, Congress did not categorize regulations of the land according to whether the regulation was
of a civil or criminal nature.
Once it is conceded that the county criminal ordinances regulate
the use of trust property, the question still remains whether or not
that regulation is inconsistent with any federal treaty, agreement, or
statute. Before examining the arguments presented to the Ninth Circuit on this point, a brief review of the standards used to test conflict
between federal and state enactments is necessary. If any conflict is
found, the federal enactment pre-empts the state enactment.
The supremacy clause of3 4the
Constitution is the source of the
8
federal doctrine of pre-emption.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution notwithstand9
ing. 34
Despite early recognition that state laws which directly contradicted
the federal law were void, 350 the degree to which conflict between
the state and federal law must exist has presented a continuing controversy for the courts. 35 1 Early cases which dealt with this question used
347. By analogy, the prohibitive requirements of both the building code in Ricci
and the rock festival ordinance in Madrigal interfere with the use of the land.
348. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
349. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
350. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the Supreme Court ruled
that a New York state law conferring a monopoly to operate steamships "collided" with
federal authorization to competitors.
351. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL
L. REV. 630 (1972); Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL.
L. FORUM 515; 16 AM. Jum. 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 198-209 (1964, Supp. 1973);
Note, Federal Preemption: Governmental Interests and the Role of the Supreme Court,
1966 DunE L.L 484; Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal
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several factual distinctions, whether the state and federal law operated
in different spheres, 52 whether the subject matter was expressly and
exclusively delegated to the Congress,3" 3 whether Congress had exercised its power to legislate, 354 or whether Congress had "occupied the
field" or subject matter.3 55
In Mintz v. Baldwin,356 the Supreme Court departed from the
theory that the exercise of federal power is inherently exclusive. Although the Court found that the subject matter regulated by federal
and state law was the same, congressional intent was held to be the
determining factor in deciding whether state law was pre-empted by
federal law. The emphasis on congressional intent employed in Mintz
has been used consistently since that time.357 Thus, even state provisions which are seemingly compatible with federal provisions are void
if congressional intent to exclude state law is found.35 8
The determination of congressional intent necessarily led the
Supreme Court to examine each case within the narrow focus of the
intent of the particular statute in question. 59 Nevertheless, certain
factors are consistently given weight in arriving at that determination.
The presence of detailed and extensive federal statutes on a particular
subject matter may "make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it."' 360 State laws whose provisions either exceed requirements in federal law, 3 6 defeat congression312 or create confusion
3 63 have
al
desire for
uniformityof within
a particular
hindering
realization
congressional
goals area,
all been found to
Preemption, 22 J. PUB. L. 391 (1973); Comment, Preemption as a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. Ray. 208 (1959).
352. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 137 (1837).
353. Id. at 157-58 (dissenting opinion); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 198-200 (1824).
354. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 93 (1926).
355. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926); Southern Ry. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 446-47 (1915); Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. v.
Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
356. 289 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1933).
357. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43 (1963); California v. Zook, 336
U.S. 725, 731 (1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
358. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964).
359. E.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638
(1973).
360. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 381 (1969);
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1965);
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 168-69 (1942).
361. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
362. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301 (1961).
363. Teamsters Local 174 v, Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
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have been pre-empted by federal law. The existence of a federal
agency created by Congress to administer a comprehensive program
may also infer the pre-emptive intent to Congress. 64 Even where actual conflict between federal and state provisions has not yet occurred,
the possibility of impairment of federal discretion may evidence congressional intent to pre-empt state laws.3 65 There exists, therefore,
a broad spectrum of criteria which a federal court may use in determining questions of pre-emption.
The Indians contended that with respect to the regulation of trust
property, Congress has clearly manifested its intent to retain exclusive
control; that control is necessarily inconsistent with any state law. If
that were not the intent of Congress, why would the protective provisions concerning land use be inserted in a statute dealing with jurisdiction? In the absence of any legislative history it may be assumed
that precisely because Congress feared that Public Law 280 might be
misconstrued to allow the type of regulations now exercised by San
Diego and Riverside Counties that the protective provisions were inserted. These provisions clearly guard against any erroneous application of the statute to interfere with the protective federal controls of
the reservations' trust status.
Again, taking the arguments used in Rincon as an example, the
conflict between the county ordinance and Public Law 280 is evidenced, according to the Band, in four ways. First, the United States
Department of the Interior, in a memorandum opinion of the deputy
solicitor, has flatly stated that even laws regulating a person's conduct
may not be applied to Indians if the effect would be to either directly
or indirectly regulate the use of trust property in any significant way.3 66
Second, Congress has legislated extensively and in great detail in the
field of land use allocation of Indian trust property.3 67 The strongest
example of this was the establishment under the Mission Indian Relief
Act of the reservations themselves to provide a home and livelihood
for the Indians.36 s The Indian Reorganization Act36 placed particular
emphasis upon the role and power of tribal government in economic
364. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of
America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
365. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973);
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286-88 (1971).
366. Memorandum Opinion of the Deputy Solicitor, No. M. 367886, Feb. 7, 1969,
cited in Opening Brief for Appellant at 19, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County
of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
367. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 381-90, 391-415(d), 464 (1970).
368. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
369. See text accompanying notes 156-59 supra.
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development activities through control of tribal lands (25 U.S.C. §
476) and formation and financing of tribal corporations (25 U.S.C.
§§ 469, 470, 477) .370 Third, the Indians pointed to the federal government's yearly statement of federal programs designed to promote
economic development of reservation resources. 3 7 ' Fourth, 25 U.S.C.
§ 415(a) gives the Secretary of the Interior the responsibility of approving leased Indian trust property with regard to land use allocation on a wide variety of subjects.3 72 If Public Law 280 is construed
to give the counties control of land use, Indians would enjoy less discretion 3in using their lands than a person who leased the land from
37
them.
The federal district court case of Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.
Kings County37 4 presents the problems involved in applying the doctrine of pre-emption to Indian lands quite clearly. In that case, the
court held that county ordinances which regulate mobile home parks
could not apply to housing projects built under the federal Housing
Improvement Program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (HIP).3 7 5 The
HIP program is specifically designed to improve housing on reservations, but the standards differ from those effective in Kings County,
California. In holding that the application of the Kings County ordinance to this Indian reservation would be inconsistent with federal
statutes and regulations,37 Judge Crocker noted that where Congress
has funded a federal construction project upon United States land, the
"project is exempt from state or local regulations that would hinder
the completion of the project. '3 77 Further, stated Judge Crocker, "to
allow Kings County to enforce its ordinance restrictions is to give it
the power to frustrate the definite federal policy embodied in 25
Even
U.S.C. § 13 to provide for the general welfare of Indians."3 7
more direct conflict was found between the county ordinances and
specific federal housing programs under whose auspices the Indians
had acquired the mobile homes.37 9 Beyond mere conflict with fed370.

Opening Brief for Appellant at 21, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.

County to San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
371. Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Appropriation for the Depart-

ment of the Interior and Related Agencies for FY-69, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
744 (1968).
372. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970).
373. Opening Brief for Appellant at 15, Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
374. Civ. No. F-836 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 12, 1973).
375. Id. at 7.
376. Id. at 5.
377. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
378. Id. at 4.
379. Id. at 5.
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eral statutes, Judge Crocker observed that application of the ordinances "could result in a complete blockage of the receipt of federal
benefits"3 0° because of the prohibitive costs and requirements necessary for compliance with the county ordinance.
The case which perhaps most closely parallels the Rincon, Ricci
and Madrigal cases with respect to federal pre-emption of the regulation of activity on federal reservations is Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Commission.8
There, the Supreme Court held against
state imposition of an income or sales tax on proceeds from trading
with Indians on the reservation.3 8s The test that case employed regarding the extent of inconsistency between state and federal laws was
whether the United States government had so occupied the field that
the exercise of state jurisdiction would interfere with or would frustrate policies furthered by federal statutes. The Court implied that
the exercise of congressional power to legislate in that area evidenced
congressional intent to do so free of any conflicting state laws. The
same reasoning may be applied to the question of extending county
ordinances which conflict with the congressional intent to encourage
tribal enterprise and self-sufficiency on the reservation.
Simply stated, county ordinances which deprive Indians of the
beneficial use of their land are inconsistent with federal laws designed
to encourage such beneficial use. The exercise of that beneficial use
of the reservation lands is at the very core of the trust relationship
established with respect to Indian land. Therefore, county ordinances
which deny the beneficial use of that trust are not only inconsistent
with the federal trust responsibility, they also effectively operate to destroy it. If there is doubt as to the proper construction of these ordinances and their conflict with federal law, the statutory rule of construction requiring resolution of that doubt in a manner most favorable
to Indians requires a determination that the federal government has
pre-empted the field of land use control of Indian reservations.
Summary of statutory issues presented to Ninth Circuit
In the absence of inherent police power jurisdiction over the Indian reservations of California, San Diego and Riverside Counties must
base any grounds for their jurisdiction over the reservations on Public
Law 280; by that act the federal government ceded limited jurisdiction to certain states. In determining the scope of that limited jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit should follow the rule of construction which
requires that doubtful expressions in federal enactments ought to be
380. Id.
381. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).

382. Id. at 691-92.
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interpreted in favor of the Indians. A favorable construction of Public
Law 280 would lead the Ninth Circuit to three conclusions: first, to
the narrow interpretation that the laws to be applied must be statewide in their application and not just of county or municipal application; second, to the finding that the imposition of the county ordinances constitutes an encumbrance in violation of Public Law 280; and
third, to the finding that imposition of the county ordinances constitutes a regulation of the use of trust property pre-empted by federal
regulation of that field.
Conclusion
For over one hundred years, the Indian tribes of California have
witnessed the deliberate appropriation of their lands by the federal
government. Today, only small pockets of land remain to them; but
however small these holdings may be, these reservations represent
a strong cultural link to a proud heritage as well as the vehicle through
which desperately needed economic assistance is channeled. County
ordinances which may accurately and fairly reflect community standards may, nevertheless, severely curtail economic and cultural development on the reservations. Therefore, the attempts to elicit an expansive judicial interpretation of the delegation of jurisdiction in Public
Law 280 from the federal government to not only the states, but to the
counties within those states, creates a struggle crucial to the survival
of the Indian Tribes of California.
The Ninth Circuit's failure to reach these issues in Rincon, Ricci,
and Madrigal delays and avoids resolution of the problem. Perhaps
the Ninth Circuit will ultimately face these questions on petitions for
rehearing or simply face the controversy in a future case. In either
case, the resolution of the proper interpretation of Public Law 280
with respect to county jurisdiction over Indian reservations may ultimately determine whether the reservations in California will develop
as economic, political, and cultural tools or deteriorate and become
obsolete due to the pervasive force of county control and regulation.
Should the courts fail to narrowly construe the delegation of jurisdiction in Public Law 280, yet another chapter may be added to the
tragic history of the confiscation of Indian lands by legal justification.
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